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The dissertation is composed of three papers, and attempts to unravel the impact of 
two potential drivers of biases in judgment and decision-making: cognitive consistency 
and associative reasoning.  
The first paper is a literature review of cognitive consistency theories. The seminal 
paradigm and the major theories it spawned are first described and integrated into a 
unified framework. In addition, this framework is used to propose a new set of research 
questions in consumer psychology.  
The second paper is a methodological paper, which primes cognitive consistency 
as a goal and tracks its influence on judgment and decision-making. Three initial studies 
demonstrate that the developed method successfully activates the goal of cognitive 
consistency. Three additional studies track the influence of cognitive consistency on three 
cognitive biases: the desirability bias, the influence of expectations on experience, and 
selective exposure. 
The third paper investigates associative reasoning as another driver of biases in 
judgment and decision-making. A method to prime associative reasoning is proposed. 
Then four studies observe its influence on four biases in judgment and decision-making: 
the availability heuristic, the representativeness heuristic, the sunk cost fallacy, and mental 
model fallacies.  
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PAPER 1: COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY THEORIES: FRAMEWORK, PROCESS, 
AND IMPLICATIONS IN CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Few people would argue that individuals strive for consistency in its fundamental 
sense of a coherent understanding of their surroundings. The alternative, some level of chaos, 
ranges from discomforting to intolerable. Even for basic tasks like survival-oriented 
prediction in the natural environment of early humans, seeking consistency in their 
surroundings must have been essential. For intellective tasks that are commonly faced today, 
finding consistency between incoming information and what the individual already knows 
would seem to be essential for interpreting and evaluating that information (Nickerson, 2008; 
Thagard, 2006).  
Consider cognitive inconsistency as the mental analogue of motion sickness. When 
sensing motion but not seeing it, as in a ship with no windows, the inner ear tells the brain 
that it senses motion, but the eyes tell the brain that everything is still. As a result of the 
mismatch between ear and eye, the brain concludes that the individual is hallucinating, 
something most likely due to poison ingestion (Treisman, 1977). In response, the brain 
induces vomiting to clear the presumed toxin. What is true for the senses is also true for 
cognition, albeit in a less extreme form. If two cognitive elements mismatch, an unpleasant 
state arises and triggers a situation-specific cognitive process whose mission is to eliminate 
the inconsistency.  
The concept of a ―cognitive mismatch‖ can be illustrated by the three consumer 
situations below: 
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(1) You are a loyal consumer of Brand X, and you believe it offers the best value on 
the market. Then you learn that this same brand uses child labor in Third World 
countries, a practice you strongly oppose.  
(2) You have been eating Brand Y at breakfast for ages and you have always 
categorized its manufacturer as a cereal company. Then this company decides to 
diversify into dog food.  
(3) You believe that Perfume Z is low-end and out of fashion. Then you come across 
an advertisement for Z portraying its use by an Italian actress you think is 
beautiful, sophisticated, and trendy.  
In each of these cases, how might consumers reconcile the two competing 
propositions (such as ―I don‘t like brand Z but I really like the Italian actress who is using 
it‖)? How would such mismatches, if salient, impact how the consumers process new 
information about the brand?  
Cognitive consistency research has focused on two questions, reconciling an observed 
inconsistency and understanding its downstream impact on subsequent information. 
Consistency theories presume the existence of an interconnected system of beliefs, that is, a 
network of beliefs in one or more domains that interact with each other. The simplest system 
contains only two beliefs, as in the three examples above. Beliefs can complement each other 
(e.g., ―Brand X makes cereals‖ and ―Brand X also makes granola bars‖), or conflict with each 
other (e.g., ―Brand X makes cereals‖ and ―Brand X also makes dog food‖).  When they 
conflict, cognitive instability arises. This instability is presumed to create a state of 
discomfort that drives a change in one or both of the beliefs, in order to restore some of the 
lost cognitive balance within the system.  
Cognitive consistency theories emerged in the 1950s and flourished during the next 
two decades. Yet the number of consistency-related publications declined drastically 
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thereafter. This decline is more apparent than real, largely due to several shifts in research 
focus.  If  the term ―cognitive consistency‖ almost disappeared, it is only because the 
phenomenon itself was interpreted from different perspectives and given different labels, 
such as ―cognitive dissonance‖ or ―self-consistency‖. Our primary objective is to provide a 
large overview of cognitive consistency theories, without focusing on one specific label or 
another. In other words, we attempt to synthesize those different perspectives in order to 
integrate them and raise new research questions. The specific contribution of this paper is 
thus threefold. We review the cognitive consistency literature and draw from it a potential 
integrative framework. Using recent findings in social and cognitive psychology, we then 
extend this framework by proposing a new process by which a desire for cognitive 
consistency may impact decision-making. Finally, we draw on the above to propose several 
research directions for consumer psychology.   
 
Cognitive Consistency Theories  
 
The common ancestor of all theories of cognitive consistency is Gestalt theory 
(Wertheimer, 1922, 1923). It focused on the formation of perceptual units, positing that one 
of the functional principles of the brain is holism or the requirement that the individual parts 
form a coherent whole. When they do not, even if due only to a single unusual or unexpected 
component of the scene, attention is automatically drawn to that component and an active 
process of comprehension begun. Analogously, cognitive consistency theories have 
postulated that beliefs are part of a system of dynamic relationships that should be coherent 
and that a dissonant belief will elicit discomfort, which the individual will try to reduce.  
The seminal idea that beliefs are driven toward consistency was manifest, over time, 
in four main research streams. We label them, in temporal order, the ―cognitive consistency 
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stream‖, ―the self-theory stream‖, the ―meaning maintenance stream‖, and the ―individual 
differences stream‖. They all focus on understanding when inconsistencies occur and how 
people recover from them. After introducing succinctly the main emphasis of each of these 
streams, we propose a single integrative framework. 
The Cognitive Consistency Stream  
 Fritz Heider‘s Balance Theory (Heider, 1946, 1958), Congruity Theory (Osgood & 
Tannenbaum, 1955), Symmetry Theory (Newcomb, 1953) and Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
(Festinger, 1957, 1964) are the major works within the cognitive consistency stream. 
Balance, Congruity, and Symmetry Theories all focused on structures of liking and disliking. 
They demonstrated how people tend to dislike conflict, or even ambivalence, and instead 
prefer consistent affective representations of social objects. In each of these theories, 
consistency was seen as a desirable end-state that individuals strive to achieve.  
The first of these, Heider‘s Balance Theory (Heider, 1946, 1958), described potential 
relationships within a simple system composed of two people p and o and a social entity of 
mutual interest x. The resulting triad was said to be consistent if any set of affective relations 
among p, o, and x is balanced (p likes o, o likes x, p likes x; or p dislikes o, p dislikes x, o 
likes x; or p dislikes o, p likes x, o dislikes x; or p likes o, p dislikes x, o dislikes x). 
Conversely, the triad was said to be inconsistent if the set of relations among elements of the 
triad is unbalanced by reversing any one of the relationships above. In any of the latter cases, 
a tension emerges and p is driven to restore a state of affective balance by modifying his/her 
attitude towards o or x.  
This seminal idea was further enriched by both the Congruity Theory of Osgood and 
Tannenbaum (1955) and the Symmetry Theory of Newcomb (1953). Osgood and 
Tannenbaum‘s domain of interest was persuasion and communication. As a result, Heider‘s 
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triad (p, x, o) was associated in Congruity Theory with an audience, a message source, and a 
concept. The mechanism is the same as in Heider‘s theory: An audience that has inconsistent 
preferences for the message source and the concept (for instance, liking the source but 
disliking its message) is driven to restore balance. Congruity Theory refined Balance Theory 
in two ways. First, instead of being only directional (like or dislike), as in Heider‘s work, the 
measurement of the attitudes of p towards x and o was quantified on a semantic differential 
scale. The second change required that, to restore balance, both the attitude towards o and x 
change, not only one or the other.   
Newcomb (1953) then enabled the extent of attitude change of the individual p 
towards o and x to depend on the strength of p‘s liking of o. In other words, Newcomb 
defended the idea that a tension towards symmetry makes the two individuals p and o defined 
in Heider‘s work likely to communicate in order to align their attitudes towards x. As a result, 
the drive to restore consistency within the social (i.e., multiperson) system was predicted to 
be higher as the bonds between o and p became stronger.  
Last but best known of these seminal stream is Festinger‘s theory of Cognitive 
Dissonance (1957), for whom dissonance, an uncomfortable state, is triggered when an 
individual holds two cognitions that are inconsistent. Four phenomena illustrate this idea. The 
first is the free-choice paradigm (e.g., Brehm, 1956), in which the positive aspects of a 
rejected alternative and the negative aspects of a chosen alternative comprise the dissonant 
elements of a decision. A decision creates commitment to a chosen alternative, which results 
in a motivational drive to reduce dissonant elements in order to avoid the discomfort 
associated with dissonance. Second is the belief-disconfirmation paradigm, which observes 
attitude change, and in particular proselytism, within a group whose beliefs are disconfirmed 
by an external event (e.g., Festinger, Riwcken, & Schachter, 1956). Third is the effort-
justification paradigm (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959), which states that dissonance can arise 
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between the effort invested in a task and its actual outcome (for instance, going through a 
severe initiation to be accepted within a group that ends up being boring). Individuals would 
then change their attitude towards the outcome in order to make it consonant with the 
invested effort (e.g., seeing the group as not boring after all). Last is the induced-compliance 
paradigm (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), in which participants are asked to behave in a 
counter-attitudinal way (e.g., writing a counter-attitudinal essay) and then change their 
attitudes to better fit their required behavior. 
While Heider, Newcomb, Osgood and Tannenbaum focused exclusively on affective 
and social representations, Festinger broadened the scope of consistency theories by 
explicitly including cognitive representations. Dissonance was not seen only as arising from 
an affective inconsistency between people and objects/ beliefs, but also from the conflict 
between two or more beliefs within a same individual. This version of cognitive dissonance 
became the seminal theory from which all revisions derived. 
The Self-Theory Stream 
  Abelson‘s 1983 article “Whatever Became of Consistency Theory?” noted that, after 
being a regular topic of the 1960s, cognitive consistency theories disappeared from research 
in the early 1970s. This apparent disappearance was explained by a reinterpretation of the 
idea of cognitive consistency through the lens of the self concept, which spawned five major 
revisions of Festinger‘s seminal theory. This stream put emphasis on the two following 
questions. Is cognitive dissonance a motivational state? What is the role played by one‘s self-
beliefs in the experience of dissonance?  
Two of the five re-interpretations are extreme and dismiss any motivational 
underpinnings to the experience of dissonance. According to the self-perception view (Bem, 
1967), people infer their attitudes (which are malleable) from their behavior. As a result, 
7 
 
 
people change their attitudes after a behavior that is discrepant with their previous attitudes 
not because they experience a need for consistency but because they adjust their attitudes on 
the basis of their behavior. According to impression management theory (Tedeschi, 
Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971), people do not really change their attitude towards the target 
object in dissonance studies. They do not experience dissonance, they just want to appear 
coherent to the experimenter. These non-motivational accounts, which totally reinterpret the 
results of Festinger‘s original theory have had trouble explaining why arousal mediates the 
relationship between an inconsistency episode and behavioral consequences (Zanna & 
Cooper, 1974; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elliot & Devine, 1994). Consequently, we do not 
consider them further. 
Three additional re-interpretations are closer to Festinger‘s (1957) cognitive 
dissonance theory and received substantial attention, including empirical testing. The self-
consistency view (Aronson, 1968) postulated that people think and behave in a way that is 
consistent with their conception of themselves. The overarching goal is to achieve 
consistency between well-founded self-beliefs and incoming information (cognitive or 
affective). Using this basic idea, Aronson (1968) emphasized that cognitive dissonance is 
more likely to occur when the inconsistency challenges our self-view as stable, competent, 
and moral. This re-interpretation of cognitive dissonance theory by Aronson (1968) was 
followed by two related theories, Cooper and Fazio‘s ―new look‖ theory (1984), and Steele‘s 
self-affirmation theory (1988). According to the new look view, dissonance is triggered when 
a behavior represents a violation of societal or normative standards that drives aversive 
consequences. According to the self-affirmation view, a discrepant behavior threatens a sense 
of self-worth. As a result, when dissonance is experienced, people are motivated to restore 
their personal integrity by focusing on other positive aspects of their self, such as important 
values and positive social-comparisons. 
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In subsequent years, researchers focused on understanding how self-beliefs trigger 
self-expectations about one‘s thoughts and behavior, which may in turn conflict with an 
actual state of the self (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). The central role of expectations in the 
experience of dissonance was also highlighted by Stone and Cooper (2001) who proposed a 
self-expectancy framework that was intended to integrate self-consistency, new look and self-
affirmation theories. They proposed that dissonance begins when people exhibit a behavior 
and then assess the behavior against self-standards. These standards can be personal (self-
beliefs in the self-consistency and self-affirmation theories) or normative (as in the new look 
theory).  
The Meaning Maintenance Stream 
More recently, the idea that a violation of expectations drives a motivational force for 
reconciling the perceived mismatch was reinterpreted by Heine, Proulx and Vohs (2006). 
This stream of research put emphasis on the two following questions. Why do we seek to 
relate objects to each other and to the self? Why do we keep mental representations that are 
internally consistent?  
To this end, Heine, Proulx and Vohs (2006)  introduced a revised consistency model 
focusing on the maintenance of meaning. In their model people are assumed to expect and 
prefer a world that is meaningful and predictable. As a result they hold mental representations 
that are composed of expected relations between elements of thoughts, which are intended to 
give meaning to the world. When meaning is threatened, individuals work towards its 
restoration. In other words, if an expected relation is disconfirmed or challenged, such as by 
an inconsistency between expectations and experience, meaning is threatened. This, in turn, 
triggers a reaffirmation process, also labeled ―fluid compensation‖ (McGregor, Zanna, 
Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Steele, 1988).  This model shares the same foundation as cognitive 
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consistency and self theories, yet it places itself in a different domain (the maintenance of 
meaning).  
The Individual Differences Stream 
The last stream of the four that we see in the domain of cognitive consistency 
emphasizes the two following questions. First, are there stable individual differences in the 
extent to which people strive to reconcile dissonant beliefs, feelings, and behaviors? If so, can 
those differences be assessed?  
A first attempt to assess individual differences in aversion to cognitive inconsistency 
is the Need for Consistency scale (NfC) developed by Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom (1995). 
Their scale is comprised of three types of preference for consistency. Private consistency is 
defined as the need for consistency between values, attitudes, and beliefs (e.g., "I am 
uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent"). Public consistency derives from the 
desire to appear consistent to other people (e.g., "The appearance of consistency is an 
important part of the image I present to the world"). Other consistency refers to the need to 
perceive others as consistent (e.g., "I want my close friends to be predictable‖). 
The Need for Consistency scale has been applied mainly to social phenomena. For 
instance, one of the consequences of a strong need for consistency is that individuals tend to 
orient their attention to the past more than to the present, in order to achieve a better match 
between past behavior and a current choice. Another consequence of a high preference for 
consistency is a stronger inclination to punish transgressions of laws. For instance, Nail, 
Bedell, and Little (2003) showed that when preference for consistency was elevated, 
participants more strongly believed that Bill Clinton should have been prosecuted for perjury 
after leaving office. In other words, when preference for consistency is elevated, individuals 
are more responsive to the incoherence between the belief that law applies to everyone and 
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the fact that Clinton was not prosecuted. In other words, high-NfC individuals give greater 
weight to prior entry variables (e.g., previous expectations, commitments, choices) and adjust 
their subsequent responses accordingly. Low-NfC individuals give less weight to the 
implications of such variables in their judgments. 
A Unified Framework 
We have tried to show that the cognitive consistency theories of the 1950s did not 
disappear. They evolved through different research streams, each focusing on specific 
contexts and, partly as a consequence, on specific features of cognitive consistency. We now 
attempt to integrate the various research streams into a unified framework of cognitive 
consistency. 
 Our conceptual framework is depicted in Part 1of Figure 1. First, an inconsistency 
between two elements in the environment triggers dissonance, as stated by Festinger in the 
original statement of the theory of cognitive dissonance. This is a direct effect. Without the 
presence of an inconsistency in the environment, no experience of cognitive dissonance can 
indeed occur. We posit that the strength of this effect depends on four other elements, which 
we conceptualize as moderators (Baron and Kenny, 1986). That is, these four variables affect 
the strength of the relation between the independent variable (an episode if inconsistency) 
and the dependent variable (felt dissonance).  
 We start with one of the most straightforward of those four elements: Individual 
differences (A), as illustrated by the work of Cialdini (1995). The more individuals are averse 
to inconsistencies, the more they are likely to experience dissonance when confronted by one. 
This makes individual differences a straightforward moderator of the relationship between an 
external inconsistency and an internal state of dissonance.  
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The second element is the presence of aversive consequences, as advanced by the new 
look theory. Aversive consequences have been shown to increase the predictive power of 
cognitive dissonance theory, but they have also been shown not to be necessary (Aronson, 
Fried, & Stone, 1991; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 
1994). As a result, it seems plausible to position their presence as a moderator of the strength 
of the main effect (B).  
 The third element is the presence of a threat to the self (C), as advanced by the self-
consistency theory. This theory has usually been considered an alternative explanation for 
Festinger‘s results and, in practice, nearly replaced cognitive dissonance theory. Although 
Aronson himself (1992) claimed only that his intention was to show conditions under which 
the predictive power of the original theory was stronger (1992, p. 305), not conditions 
necessary to the experience of dissonance: ―dissonance is greatest and clearest when it 
involves not just any two cognitions but, rather, a cognition about the self and a piece of our 
behavior that violates that self-concept.” In other words, self-beliefs do not need to be 
involved to experience dissonance, but the impact of the inconsistency episode on the felt 
dissonance is stronger when it threatens the self. Again, this is the strict definition of a 
moderator.  
This idea had already been advanced by Greenwald and Ronis (1978, p.56), and our 
contribution is only to place this idea of a threat to the self (C) within a unified framework: 
“Perhaps the only victim of the evolutionary process is the original version of dissonance 
theory, which has effectively been discarded. But has it ever really been proven wrong? 
Consider the possibility that dissonance researchers abandoned portions of the original 
theory because their experiments inadvertently tapped self-protective cognitive processing 
instead of, or in addition to, dissonance reduction. The ego-related cognitive processes, being 
relatively easy to observe, may have pulled the theory in their direction. Had effort been 
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directed instead at achieving more precise methods of testing the original dissonance 
formulation, perhaps more support for it would have been obtained.”. Furthermore, as 
already noted by Stone and Cooper (2001) in a framework focused on self-theories, when 
self-affirmation opportunities (D) are made salient (for instance, by reaffirming core values), 
the impact of the self-threat on the felt dissonance is weaker. This makes of D a moderator of 
the impact of self-threat on felt dissonance.  
 The fourth element is the presence of a meaning threat (E). This is somehow the only 
genuinely speculative part of the initial framework, because dissonance theories have never 
been explicitly discussed by Heine, Proulx, and Vohs (2006). The question is whether 
striving to reduce inconsistency is triggered only when meaning is threatened. As mentioned 
before, in the meaning maintenance model meaning is threatened when experience conflicts 
with an expected relation.  Thus, dissonance is experienced only when one of the two 
cognitive elements in the mismatch is derived from experience, while the other is based on an 
expectation.  These sources disqualify inconsistencies between two cognitive elements such 
as ―I am a smoker‖ and ―smoking causes cancer‖ from the pool of situations that may trigger 
dissonance.  
It seems fairer to us and more conservative to think that expectations and experience 
are two types of cognitive elements that may trigger a stronger feeling of discomfort than to 
think that they are necessary to any experience of dissonance. Thus, we also place meaning 
threat as a moderator of the relationship between inconsistency episode and felt dissonance. 
Finally, as proposed by Heine, Proulx and Vohs (2006), when opportunities to reaffirm 
meaning are made salient (F), the impact of the meaning threat on the felt dissonance is 
weaker. This makes of F a moderator of the impact of meaning-threat on felt dissonance. 
In 1992, Aronson (p. 307) stated: “In the past few years, a phethora of minitheories 
has sprung up (…). Each of these theories is a worthy and interesting effort at combining 
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cognition and motivation, but each has a limited scope; in my judgment, with a little work, 
every one of them can be contained under the general rubric of dissonance theory.” 
In a similar fashion, our model claims that a single direct effect (an inconsistency 
episode) accounts for cognitive dissonance, as stated in the earlier version of the theory. 
However, we fully recognize that the strength of the effect may vary with the type of 
cognitive elements that mismatch, viz., self-beliefs, behavior, attitudes, experience, 
expectations. Some situations may decrease one‘s sense of self-worth, produce aversive 
social consequences, or threatens our sense of meaning, which in turn contributes to trigger a 
stronger feeling of dissonance.  
Given this initial framework and the literature that led us to it, we now turn to 
extending it. Our approach is to try to understand the process by which consistency 
influences attitudes and behaviors.  
 
Extending the Framework 
 
   As we have seen in the previous section, the existing literature has focused on 
identifying the conditions under which Festinger‘s dissonance theory is more likely to occur. 
As a result, for fifty years it has focused on defining when dissonance would be felt and, in 
turn, when attitude change would occur.  
 In this section we attempt to answer three new questions that previous literature didn‘t 
emphasize. First, how should cognitive consistency be conceptualized? Second, how does 
cognitive consistency affect information processing, that is, what is its downstream impact on 
cognition? Finally, what are the available methods for measuring and manipulating the level 
of consistency individuals strive for? 
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 To this purpose, we propose to extend the existing conceptual framework (see part 2 
of Figure 1) adding a processing framework. First and in response to question 1 above, we 
propose that consistency may be a cognitive goal (proposition 1). Then, addressing our 
second question, we claim that activating cognitive consistency may trigger a specific 
cognitive procedure, or mindset, designed to increase the internal state of consistency 
(proposition 2). We also propose that social and cognitive psychology offer new methods to 
elevate and measure levels of consistency (proposition 3). Such methods should enable the 
empirical test of the first 2 propositions.  
Proposition 1: Cognitive Consistency is a Goal 
In every theory reviewed above, an inconsistency generates discomfort and a striving 
to restore consistency. As Tannenbaum (1968, p. 344) stated, ―some degree of consistency 
and equilibrium (…) [is] essential for reasons of parsimony and economy of effort, as well as 
to allow for the predictability of, and hence adaptability to, subsequent encounters.”  We 
posit with our first proposition that this amounts to assume consistency is a desirable end-
state or, equivalently, a cognitive goal. When an inconsistency is detected, we engage in 
cognitive actions to return to a more acceptable level of cognitive consistency (a level that 
may vary between situations and individuals).   
Research over the last 10 years has revealed a great deal about the nature and 
behavior of goals (e.g., Ferguson & Porter, 2009; Foster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007).  
Goals are cognitive constructs represented in memory that motivate and direct action. 
Although controversy remains over the definition of a goal, we shall adopt the most common 
view, that a goal is a “cognitive representation of a desire end-point that impacts evaluations, 
emotions and behaviors.” (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, p. 491). Goals contain information 
about their end-states that can vary in abstractness (consistency being an abstract goal) and 
include a variety of behaviors, plans, and objects that enable one to reach the end-state. For 
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instance, the achievement goal might include planning behaviors, such as a study schedule 
for an exam. When a goal is primed, its entire network is activated. Such goal activation also 
inhibits information that would hamper its achievement (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). 
Thus, we propose that cognitive consistency is a goal that may contain not only the 
actual end point of being consistent, but also context-specific strategies to reach this end-
point. Strategies may include avoiding disconfirming information, making new information 
fit previous beliefs, committing to choices, positive affective information, and memories of 
previous experiences related to consistency (such as instances of brand loyalty or 
commitment to a choice). In parallel, it may inhibit conflicting goals such as, in certain 
contexts, the goals of being accurate, of variety-seeking, or other.  
Proposition 2: The goal of consistency is associated to a specific cognitive procedure, or 
mindset of consistency 
The research streams reviewed so far all focus on understanding how inconsistencies 
arise and how people recover from them. Yet, as early as the ‗60s, a different and entirely 
parallel stream of research in cognitive psychology emerged, focusing on understanding how 
a consistency property governed the cognitive system. In  1968 McGuire lamented that the 
existing cognitive consistency theories studied consistency as an end and not as a means for 
throwing light on thought processes (as he claimed they should). This disinclination to follow 
the steps of earlier cognitive consistency theorists did not come from a disagreement with the 
content of their research, but from a different view on what topic is ―most deserving of 
attention‖ (McGuire, 1968, p. 141): “I have obviously been rather disappointed and regretful 
about the main directions which consistency theory has taken … Where I would have taken 
the need consistency for granted and used it to map the cognitive system, the subsequent work 
has largely taken the cognitive system for granted, and tried to clarify the need for 
consistency. It has sidestepped the cognitive structure question.”  
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McGuire‘s research agenda spawned current cognitive psychology research based on 
coherence-driven mechanisms of constraint satisfaction (e.g., Read & Miller, 1994; Shultz & 
Lepper, 1996; Simon & Holyoak, 2002; Spellman, Ullman, & Holyoak, 1993; Thagard, 
1989). These models predict how belief systems get modified by incoming information and 
observe how they eliminate potential inconsistencies. For instance Spellman, Ullman and 
Holyoak (1993) developed a computational model they labeled Co3, for ―Coherence Model 
of Cognitive Consistency‖. The demonstration network in their naturalistic study concerned 
attitudes related to the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. It was composed of sub-attitudes 
towards pacifism, isolationism, the war‘s legitimacy, Saddam Hussein, terrorism, and an  
overall attitude toward the Iraq war. They demonstrated that when one sub-attitudes was 
significantly modified by external information (for instance, newspapers influencing the 
reader to see Saddam Hussein as a real threat to the United States), it directly contributed to a 
change in the global attitude of support for the U.S. military‘s action, which in turn 
contributed to a modification of other sub-attitudes (for instance, pacifism or isolationism). 
Thus each cognitive element simultaneously influenced and was influenced by its network, 
directly or indirectly, until the network reaches an optimal state free of inconsistencies. 
In this case, consistency is seen not only as a desirable end-state but also, even 
foremost as a property of the cognitive system, that is, as a way to organize our current 
thoughts and to process incoming information. In other words, a cognitive consistency goal is 
seen as associated to a specific cognitive procedure that eliminate inconsistencies and settles 
systems of beliefs into consistent states.  This conceptualization matches the concept of 
mindset as a cognitive procedure or sequence of actions
1
 (for a review, see Wyer & Xu, 
2010).  
                                                          
1
  Alternative types of mindsets are also reviewed by Wyer and Xu (2010). 
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A mindset is defined as a cognitive or behavioral procedure that is associated with a 
particular goal. For instance, Xu and Wyer (2008) have already studied the comparison 
mindset, that is, the cognitive procedure associated with the goal of comparing. A 
particularity of mindset is that, once activated, it is then more likely to be used subsequently, 
even in a different domain, and even without the activation of associated goal. Xu and Wyer 
(2008) have thus shown that comparing animals makes people more likely in a subsequent 
task to buy a product because they have automatically started to compare those products. 
Similarly, we propose that the goal of consistency is associated to a specific cognitive 
procedure, or mindset of consistency, by which disparate elements are connected to form a 
coherent entity. Furthermore, once activated, it is more likely to remain active in the short 
term and thereby be used in new domain, such as decision-making, and independently of the 
activation of the goal of consistency.   
Proposition 1 and 2 have implicitly argued that consistency theories rely on two 
dimensions: a motivational dimension, and a cognitive dimension. The motivational element 
(goal activation driven by an inconsistency) directly triggers a process stored in memory that 
can reconcile the inconsistent elements (mindset activation). The process by which the 
mindset operates then, in turn, drives an attitudinal and/or behavioral change. This change is 
either sufficient to attain the goal, or not sufficient. In the latter case, the goal remains active 
and prompts further cognitive actions, until the goal is reached or is abandoned (see part 2 of 
Figure 1).  
These two propositions naturally prompt the question of the relation between the goal 
and mindset versions of consistency. A mindset is a procedure activated by a goal as a means 
to achieve it. When a goal is frequently activated, its subsequent mindset becomes closely 
associated with it. Then this goal-mindset association can be activated bidirectionally so that 
activating the mindset also activates its associated goal (Wyer & Xu, 2010). This is 
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necessarily only speculative in the domain of cognitive consistency. However, it need not 
remain so. We suggest that understanding how the goal and mindset versions of consistency 
operate may best be achieved empirically. 
Proposition 3: Consistency levels can be elevated and measured 
Once we move into the empirical realm, much depends on methods. We have just 
claimed that our first two propositions might be tested empirically. Fortunately, we now have 
methods that were not available decades ago. We hope that the application of these new 
methods will help to test the processing framework we are proposing.  
Priming consistency as a goal.  The most familiar goal activation methods involve 
some form of semantic priming (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Participants are exposed to 
words related to the goal, which in turn leads them to engage in goal-congruent behavior. For 
instance, participants are asked to solve scrambled sentences with words related to hostility, 
which leads them subsequently to exhibit hostile behavior (Srull & Wyer, 1979). This 
approach has already been successfully applied in research on consistency (Russo, Carlson, 
Meloy, & Yong, 2008). However, we note that the power of semantic priming to actually 
drive a motivational state has recently been questioned (Sela & Shiv, 2009).  Using semantic 
methods may indeed only prime the semantic network associated to one particular goal, 
without inducing a real motivation to pursue that goal.  
The priming of an actual motivational state requires a difference between the actual 
state and a desired state (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Sela & Shiv, 2009; Zeigarnik, 
1967). A behavioral task that triggers such a discrepancy should prime the goal to reduce it. 
This is behavioral priming of a goal. Note that this is actually what is done in all cognitive 
dissonance studies. For instance, participants in an induced-compliance paradigm write a 
counter attitudinal essay, which creates a state of inconsistency that motivates participants to 
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restore consistency.  
If a motivation to reach the goal is successfully primed, then the goal activation 
increases when a delay frustrates goal attainment (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, 
& Troetschel, 2001; Förster et al., 2007). Thus, a manipulation check of goal activation 
should include two measurement times, one immediately after the priming and one after a 
delay of a few minutes. The delay condition is expected to yield greater level of activation 
than the immediate condition, thereby increasing its effect on a dependent measure.  
Interestingly, long before the current study of goals and the impact of a delay, Walster 
and Berscheid (1968) dedicated an entire chapter in ―Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A 
Sourcebook‖ to the effects of time on cognitive consistency. They highlighted how inserting 
a delay between the experimental manipulation and the measurement of the dependent 
variable actually decreased the variability in the data: ―A delay between the manipulation of 
dissonance and the measurement of the resulting dissonance reduction was incorporated into 
many dissonance studies. Researchers found that such a delay increased their predictive 
ability. Since time is not itself an independent variable in any of the consistency theories, this 
delay is not necessary theoretically. But in practice such a delay is often essential.‖ Without 
the benefit of what we now know about the temporal pattern of goal activation, frustration, 
and attainment, Walster and Berscheid seem to have described consistency as a goal.  
Priming consistency as a mindset. Activating consistency as a mindset means 
finding a task that requires the repeated used use of a process or procedure that achieves 
consistency (Wyer & Xu, 2010). Repetition of such a task should build momentum for that 
consistency-achieving procedure. Then, when subsequently presented with an unrelated task 
that can be completed by applying a consistency mindset (i.e., procedure), performance in 
this second task should be elevated.  One plausible priming manipulation is a task from 
standard tests like the SAT, such as completing a sentence by filling in the best fitting word 
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(e.g., ―Today‘s small, portable computers contrast markedly with the earliest electronic 
computers, which were _____; A. effective, B. invented, C. useful, D. enormous‖; Kensler, 
2009). Alternatively, maybe something as simple as solving a set of anagrams could prime 
consistency as a mindset while participants repeatedly rearrange letters to make a legitimate 
word (e.g., EBLTA to TABLE).  
The temporal pattern of a mindset‘s activation differs from that of a goal. A delay of a 
few minutes is more likely to cause the activation to dissipate, although at an unknown rate. 
As a consequence, if two measurement times are included in a study on the nature of 
cognitive consistency, the delay condition should exhibit weaker results than the immediate 
(no-delay) condition if consistency is a mindset. We have seen that the reverse pattern, 
stronger results after a delay, should be observed when consistency is activated as a 
motivational state. Thus, the temporal pattern of activation may enable to distinguish between 
goal activation and mindset activation, and in turn, allow for understanding how they relate to 
each other. 
Measuring the activation level of consistency. In addition to the advances in 
priming methods, we also have at our disposal at least two methods that confirm that 
consistency has been primed and can follow its activation level over time. Those are reaction 
times (Abad, Noguera, & Ortells, 2003; de Groot, 1985; Neely, 1991), and the Retrospective 
Assessment of Goals (RAG) method (Carlson, 2001, 2010; Russo et al., 2008).  
Reaction time measurement consists in verifying the effectiveness of a priming 
method by checking whether participants respond faster to words related to the goal, for 
instance, orally naming those words. This method relies on the network of concepts 
associated to the goal. If a goal is primed, then the entire network is activated, which results 
in faster reaction times to closely connected concepts like related words.  
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The RAG method requires that decision makers speak their thoughts aloud, in 
Carlson‘s case (2001) during a decision making task. These concurrent verbal protocols are 
audio recorded. Then immediately after finishing their choice, participants use a replay of the 
recording to prompt the recall their goal activation levels during the choice and to report 
those levels on ―log sheets‖. Each goal log sheet lists the decision process goals in 
alphabetical order, with each goal‘s definition after its name. Individuals report their goal 
activation levels for each goal on a scale from 0 ―not at all active‖ to 100 ―maximally active‖. 
Each time segment of the choice process can have its own goal sheet. For example, a binary 
choice between two options described by six attributes might be partitioned into six 
segments, with goal activation assessed after each segment (Russo et al., 2008). The replay of 
the verbal protocol (and possibly other process cues) facilitates goal recall in much the same 
way that a reproduction of the total context in which an event was encoded into memory (i.e., 
context-dependent) typically improves recall (Godden & Baddeley 1975; Tulving 1983). 
What results from the RAG method is a set of activation levels for each goal over the course 
of the choice or judgment process. This method should enable researchers to confirm the 
activation of either the mindset or the goal of consistency. A simpler version of the RAG 
Method was developed by Carlson et al. (2010), one that does not require a concurrent verbal 
protocol and that can be administered online. The major benefit is that goal activation is 
assessed during the decision-making process, and not after, and thus does not require the 
recording of verbal protocols. This recent method was also used successfully to demonstrate 
that individuals can report automatically activated goals. 
Both of Carlson‘s methods depend on two innovations for detecting goal activation 
more sensitively than previous methods. First, goal activation is assessed directly by the 
individual, either during the primary process (Carlson, 2010) or shortly afterwards (Carlson, 
2001). Second, the Carlson methods use a continuous scale rather than an all-or-none 
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response in which participants report a goal as having been active or not.  Both innovations 
seem to be necessary to the sensitive measurement of goal activation and seem to reveal the 
activation level of goals better than prior methods (Carlson et al., 2010).   
Summary. 
 We have tried to show that cognitive consistency theories rely on both a motivational 
component (a goal) and a cognitive component (a procedure for attaining the goal, that is, a 
mindset). Further, these two may work together to reach an internal state of consistency (part 
2 of Figure 1). We have also tried to show that work in social and cognitive psychology 
supplies new building blocks to test those propositions. These may advance research on 
cognitive consistency and contribute to understanding the process by which an inconsistency 
in the environment produces attitudinal and behavioral responses. A last objective is to argue 
that a better understanding of cognitive consistency theories may also help to explain a 
variety of phenomena in consumer psychology.  
 
Implications for research in consumer psychology 
 
Our extended framework posits the potential existence of a goal of consistency and of 
an associated cognitive procedure, which prompts numerous questions in consumer 
psychology. The list of applications that follows is in no way intended to be exhaustive. Our 
purpose is solely to present selected sample of the research possibilities suggested by our 
propositions. 
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Cognitive consistency as a potential process explanation in consumer phenomena 
Priming consistency should provide useful evidence of the process underlying at least 
some common consumer phenomena. In this section we present three such phenomena for 
which a consistency need has been suggested but without definitive empirical evidence. 
Expectations and experience. Cognitive consistency should be one driver of the 
process by which expectations influence experience. For instance, visual perception is 
influenced not only see by what is objectively viewed but by our expectations (e.g., Balcetis 
& Dunning, 2006).  In consumer psychology, numerous studies demonstrate that our 
expectations directly impact perceptual experiences. For instance, Lee, Fredericks and Ariely 
(2006) demonstrated that taste expectations for a beer directly influence liking. Hong and 
Kang (2006) highlighted that product evaluations are increased when a product is typical of 
those manufactured in the country of origin. The expectations derived from the country of 
origin guide how we perceive the quality of products. Why are we not better at forming 
accurate perceptions? The role of consistency in this phenomenon has already been proposed 
but has remained a controversial explanation (see Coppin, Delplanque, Cayeux, Porcherot, & 
Sander, 2010). We suggest that this controversy may be resolved by using a reliable method 
for priming the need for consistency. 
Social influence. Early research on cognitive consistency was related to consistency 
within social networks. Social influence is an area in which a pressure to reach consensus can 
be observed. Peer pressure can be defined as an influence exerted by a group on a peer to 
follow the norms of the group. The result is often a change in beliefs or behavior to match the 
norms of the group (Greenspan, 1998). Berns, Capra, Moore and Noussair (2009) used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the neural mechanisms associated 
with social influence among adolescents in the domain of music. They measure judgments of 
preference and neurobiological responses to clips of songs, with and without the overall 
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popularity of the song revealed. They find a main effect of popularity on the participant‘s 
song attitudes. The fMRI results reveal that a principal mechanism whereby popularity 
ratings affect consumer choice is through “the anxiety generated by the mismatch between 
one's own preferences and others. This mismatch anxiety motivates people to switch their 
choices in the direction of the consensus. Our data suggest that this is a major force behind 
the conformity observed in music tastes in some teenagers.” This finding suggests that 
inconsistency creates anxiety, which further drives a need to match one‘s preferences to those 
of one‘s social group. This result is in line with the hypothesis that social influence follows a 
consistency principle, and may help explain how and why brand communities are formed and 
brands valued so highly within those communities.  
Motivated Reasoning: Selective exposure and information distortion. Motivated 
reasoning is the reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes to obtain support for a 
preferred conclusion (Kunda, 1990). We posit that a goal of cognitive consistency might play 
a role in this phenomenon. So far the motivated reasoning literature focuses mostly on input-
outputs experiments, showing that the motivation to reach a desirable conclusion affects the 
information we attend to and process. However it lacks a more general and abstract process 
explanation by which the effect takes place. We propose that cognitive consistency may 
provide one such explanation.   
In consumer research, motivated reasoning has multiple facets. We take two of them 
as illustrations. First, motivated reasoning can refer to selective exposure to confirmatory 
information. The selective exposure bias enables “people to defend their attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors by avoiding information likely to challenge them and seeking information 
likely to support them” (Hart et al., 2009).  As a result, a defense motivation seems to be a 
straightforward driver of the selective exposure bias, and has already been linked to cognitive 
dissonance (Frey, 1986). It seems straightforward to posit that the goal of reaching 
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consistency is related to a defense motivation. Though, it would be nice to be able to prove it 
empirically, and our conceptualization might just enable to do such thing. More interestingly, 
another and unexpected driver of the selective exposure bias is an accuracy motivation, which 
has been shown to decrease the selective exposure bias when primed before or during the 
decision-making process, and increase it after the choice has been made. Reasons for this 
phenomenon are still unclear (Fisher & Greitemeyer, 2010). We note that most choice tasks 
imply aggregating different pieces of information to reach an overall consistent impression of 
a product. As a result, it is possible to assume that most choice tasks actually activate a 
mindset of consistency, which in turn may interact with any accuracy priming done after 
choice. Though speculative, this hypothesis would contribute to explain inconsistent results 
in the selective exposure literature.  
Second, motivated reasoning can appear as information distortion, which is defined as 
the biased evaluation of new information to support an emerging preference or belief (Russo, 
Meloy & Medvec, 1998; Russo & Chaxel, 2010).  Specifically, during a choice process, as 
one alternative naturally emerges as the tentative leader, individuals typically interpret 
incoming information as favoring this leader more than they should. Russo, et al. (2008) 
showed that cognitive consistency is a driver of the distortion process. A better understanding 
of the desire for consistency might further illuminate this finding, and apply it to other 
motivated reasoning phenomena, such as biased memory (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; 
Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong., 1990), self-serving attributions of behavior (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987), or the desirability bias (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). 
Natural primings of consistency 
The distinctions drawn above between consistency as a goal and as a mindset imply 
for a search of different naturally occurring sources of activation. A particular context would 
prime the goal of consistency if it creates a motivational drive to restore consistency. This 
27 
 
 
drive would last until the goal is fulfilled. Conversely, a situation would prime a mindset of 
consistency if it activates an associated procedure. This activation would not need any delay 
to be further activated.  
As one example consider consumers who are exposed to information inconsistent 
with the image of a brand. This should activate the consistency goal, that is, a desire to make 
the information fit with previous beliefs. That goal should stay activated until its resolution. 
As a second example of a naturally occurring prime, consider consumers who in their local 
newspaper are playing mind games such as crosswords or Sudoku. This might activate a 
consistency mindset that, in turn, would influence how the readers are processing 
information. Even if highly speculative, this assumption is in agreement with Wyer and Xu‘s 
series of experiments (2010) in which priming a mindset in one domain can impact judgment 
and decision-making in a completely different setting. 
Segmentation Strategy 
 Preliminary evidence by Cialdini (2005) suggests that people differ in their chronic 
level of consistency activation., Might this individual difference be the basis for a 
segmentations strategy? That is, could individuals be usefully categorized by their need for 
consistency? Might such a consistency-based segmentation help to predict their willingness 
to reconcile disconfirming evidence with their existing network of beliefs?  
Recall our first example: ―You are a loyal consumer of Brand X, and you believe it 
offers the best value on the market. Then you learn that this same brand uses child labor in 
Third world countries, something you strongly oppose.‖ As a result, a first application of a 
consistency-based segmentation might predict how consumers would react to indisputable 
evidence of a break in the implicit contract between them and the company, i.e., to a break of 
trust. One example of such a break is Toyota‘s large recall in 2009. How was the news 
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accepted and digested by loyal Toyota consumers? How did it impact their system of beliefs 
towards the brand, particularly its presumed safety?  
Another domain of application would be brand extensions, as briefly mentioned in the 
introduction. Recall the question: ―You have been eating Brand Z at breakfast for ages and 
you have always categorized it as a cereal company. This same company decides to diversify 
and invest into dog food‖.  We argue that, if a consistency drive is strongly activated, it is 
possible to assume that people in general see unrelated elements as being more similar than 
they actually are. Would consistency explain why some brand extensions are more successful 
than others? More precisely, are consumers with a greater chronic desire for consistency 
more accepting of near brand extensions and more rejecting of far ones? 
Finally, we argue that advertising may also benefit from more insights from a 
cognitive consistency segmentation. What happens when a seller makes a claim that is 
inconsistent with its brand image? Would an increased activation of the goal of consistency 
improve its receptiveness? Recall the last example of our introduction: ―You believe that the 
Perfume Y is too strong, low-end, and out of fashion. You come across an advertisement for 
Y portraying its use by an Italian actress you think is beautiful, sophisticated and trendy‖. 
Would people for whom a goal of consistency is strongly activated incorporate the new 
image more easily into the core of the brand image?  
 
Conclusion 
We hope to have made the point that several insights, theoretical and methodological, from 
social and cognitive psychology allow for a new look at consistency theories, and the 
development of new research questions in consumer psychology. Coming back to the 
fundamentals of cognitive consistency theories and applying new knowledge should allow for 
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a better grasp of how this need influences information processing, and, in fine, our 
preferences and choices.  
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PAPER 2: THE INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY ON JUDGMENT 
 
Cognitive consistency is a fundamental topic with a long history that has begun to 
return to research prominence (Gawronski & Strack, 2012). The substantial interest it 
received in the 1960‘s declined so much that by 1983 Abelson could title an article, 
―Whatever became of consistency theory?‖. Yet cognitive consistency continued to play an 
active role in research, if sometimes under other labels like coherence (Holyoak & Simon, 
1999), compatibility (Goertzel, 1994), and balance (Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2012). 
The diversity of labels was compounded by a dispersal of interest across several subareas of 
psychology, such as belief systems (McGuire & McGuire, 1991), interpersonal relations 
(Walther & Weil, 2010), legal judgments (Pennington & Hastie, 1988; Simon, Snow, & 
Read, 2004), reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2004; Thagard, 2000, 2006), 
and social cognition (Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; 
Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993).  
The renewed focus on cognitive consistency is motivated by at least two factors. First 
and fundamental, one can reasonably claim that our ability to organize our understanding of 
the external environment and, more importantly, to predict its opportunities and risks depends 
on sensing consistent relations among various cues and consequences. That is, the skill of 
detecting consistencies is necessary to adapt to the various environments in which we must 
function. The natural conclusion from  the fundamental status of cognitive consistency,  is its 
potential value in explaining a broad range of phenomena such as the list noted above. Even 
focusing on a single topic like belief systems, cognitive consistency might help to understand 
their structure (Read & Simon, 2011),  the need to maintain a justification for a belief 
(Nickerson, 1998), and the reconciliation of new information with existing beliefs. For 
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instance, regarding the last, Nickerson stated, ―Surely everyone would agree that beliefs 
should be consistent with whatever evidence one has (Nickerson, 2008, p. 59)‖. 
A second reason an empirical exploration of the role of cognitive consistency in 
multiple phenomena is the availability of methods for studying goals. A case can be made 
that a major reason for the decline in applications of cognitive consistency after the 1960‘s 
was the lack of efficient methods for manipulating the activation of consistency. At that time 
studying cognitive consistency by activating it in an experimental context often required 
manipulations that were idiosyncratic to the research task. For instance, in the forced 
compliance paradigm, priming cognitive consistency typically required a participant to write 
a counterattitudinal statement, with the consistency-driven consequence being a change in 
that same attitude (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).  Instead, the new methods use a 
manipulation of the activation levels of various goals (i.e., goal priming) that is independent 
of the subsequent criterion task. In addition, the new methods include ways to  assess the 
activation levels of goals. Such assessments can both validate the success of the priming 
methods and measure goals‘ activation levels across tasks and time. Just as important to the 
validity of their application, the new priming tactics can be implemented without the 
experimental participants aware that a goal has been activated, thereby precluding 
explanations based on demand effects (Custers & Aarts 2010). These methods were not 
available several decades ago. Their current availability enables tests of the goal of 
consistency as a driver of judgments that could not have been performed in the past. Their 
use is essential to the current research.   
What is cognitive consistency? This is a question that we don‘t propose to answer 
because there are multiple competing conceptualizations that have not been reconciled and 
their reconciliation is not our objective. For some cognitive consistency is a ―fundamental 
principle of information processing‖ (Gawronski & Strack, 2012, p. 3) or, equivalently, a 
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basic property of belief systems (McGuire, 1968). Others see it as a structure of relations 
among cognitive elements or at least as a characteristic or measurable property of such a 
structure (Read & Simon, 2011). For a third group of psychologists cognitive consistency is a 
―means of disconfirming or refuting a hypothesis or a knowledge claim‖ (Kruglanski and 
Shteynberg, 2012, p. 250). This notion of cognitive consistency as a means to an end is 
similar to seeing it as a mindset, that is as a procedure learned to achieve a desired goal 
(Wyer and Xu, 2010). Finally, cognitive consistency is often viewed as a goal in the sense of 
a desired end-state (Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007). This last is the perspective that we adopt. 
Because we treat the desire for cognitive consistency as a goal, our research 
necessarily builds on work on goals (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; 
Baumgartner & Pieters, 2008). We note that cognitive consistency is a process goal, those 
that are confined to the process itself and are satisfied, or frustrated, during that process 
(Carlson et al., 2008; Van Osselaer et al., 2005). Other examples are conserving effort 
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1990) and avoiding negative emotions (Luce, Payne, & 
Bettman, 2001). Process goals can be contrasted with goals defined by an outcome of the 
process, such as the response to a problem or the selected alternative in a decision.  
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The first section describes the 
priming method that was developed to activate the goal of cognitive consistency. The second 
section describes the research strategy and proposes several phenomena as candidates that are 
driven, at least in part, by the desire for cognitive consistency. The third section describes the 
experiments associated with our research strategy.  
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Priming Consistency as a Goal: Method Development 
The most familiar goal activation methods involve some form of semantic priming 
(Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Participants are exposed to words related to a goal that, in turn, 
lead them to engage in goal-congruent behavior. For instance, when participants are asked to 
solve scrambled sentences with words related to hostility, they subsequently exhibit hostile 
behavior (Srull & Wyer, 1979). This approach has already been successfully applied in 
research on consistency (Russo, Carlson, Meloy, & Yong, 2008). However, we note that the 
power of semantic priming to actually drive a motivational state is disputed (Forster, 
Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Nelissen, Dijker, & de Vries, 2005). The concern is that 
semantic methods may prime only the semantic network associated with a goal and not the 
goal itself.  The observed impact on behavior might have occurred through an automatic 
perception-behavior link without needing a real motivational drive to pursue the relevant 
goal. Because of the uncertainty of semantic methods‘ efficacy, we chose a different 
approach to priming the goal of cognitive consistency.  
The priming of an actual motivational state requires a difference between the actual 
state and a desired state (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Sela & Shiv, 2009; Zeigarnik, 
1967). A behavioral task that creates such a discrepancy should prime the goal to reduce that 
difference. This is behavioral priming of a goal. It is a more direct approach than semantic 
priming and should prove more reliable. Thus, we sought a task in which participants would 
be faced with an inconsistency between beliefs that was very difficult to resolve. Then the 
motivation to restore an acceptable level of consistency should carry over to an immediately 
subsequent (criterion) task. 
Several attempts to find such a priming task led us to the use of a conundrum, a 
problem that requires participants to resolve two seemingly inconsistent facts. One such 
conundrum is, ―Why do we criticize traders for being overpaid but accept football players 
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and movie stars' salaries?‖ The expected inability to provide a fully satisfactory answer 
should activate the goal of consistency and, because it has not been attained, carry over that 
activation to a subsequent task (Förster et al., 2007; Zeigarnik, 1967). 
Furthermore, if a goal is successfully activated, then a delay that frustrates its 
attainment further increases the level of activation (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, 
& Troetschel, 2001; Förster et al., 2007). Thus, any goal priming tactic  should produce an 
even higher level of activation after a delay of a few minutes. For this reason, the new 
priming method always consisted of two tasks, the first one to activate the goal of consistency 
followed by a filler task that delayed goal achievement. These two tasks were then followed 
by one of several criterion tasks that each tested a theoretical prediction about the role of 
cognitive consistency.   
Note that our first objective was methodological, not theoretical. That is, we sought a 
method for reliably priming the goal of cognitive consistency, using whatever techniques we 
could devise. We have not attempted to study the basis of those techniques‘ success, for 
instance by testing both semantic and conundrum-driven priming or by validating the benefit 
of a delay to increase the level of activation. We first wanted to find a priming process that 
worked. 
 
Research Strategy 
 
Research Design 
In all the studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, goal 
priming versus control. In the priming condition, participants were given 3 minutes to answer 
44 
 
 
a conundrum, followed by a 5-minute delay task. In the control condition, participants were 
directed to the 5-minute delay task without answering the conundrum.   
In experiments 1, 3 and 4 the delay task was a 5-minute silent film, an extract of 
Charlie Chaplin‘s ―The Kid‖ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MUBrClhgks). In 
experiments 2, 5 and 6 participants responded to the following: ―Describe one interesting 
thing you did last week. Your challenge is to enable the reader to experience, through your 
words, what you yourself did.‖ Both tasks served their purpose and, as near as we could tell, 
are interchangeable. 
The only difference among experiments is the criterion task, which was chosen to fit 
the purpose of each study. More specifically, our experiments aim to meet two objectives. 
The first (Experiments 1-3) is to verify that our behavioral priming method (conundrum, 
followed by a delay) successfully primes the goal of cognitive consistency. The second 
objective (Experiments 4, 5 and 6) is to demonstrate the impact of the goal of cognitive 
consistency on three different judgmental phenomena. 
Method Validation: Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
We first looked for different, convergent methods that would enable us to confirm that 
consistency has been successfully primed by our manipulation. We selected three.  
Experiment 1 uses an implicit measurement of goal activation, based on reaction time 
measurements (Abad, Noguera, & Ortells, 2003; de Groot, 1985; Neely, 1991). This method 
verifies the effectiveness of a priming method by checking whether participants respond 
faster to words related to the goal when orally naming those words. This technique relies on 
the network of concepts associated to the goal. If a goal is primed, then the entire network is 
activated, which results in faster reaction times to closely connected concepts like related 
words.  
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Experiment 2 uses an explicit measurement of goal activation (Carlson et al., 2010). 
Participants are interrupted during a task and asked to record their level of activation of one 
or more goals. The timing of this method is important because if asked post-task when the 
goal has been accomplished, its activation level would have dropped substantially, possibly 
below a level of conscious awareness (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007).  
Experiment 3 uses a behavioral measure of the activation of cognitive consistency, the 
predecisional information distortion (ID). ID is the biased evaluation of new information to 
support an emerging preference or belief. Specifically, during a choice process, as one 
alternative naturally emerges as the tentative leader, individuals typically interpret incoming 
information as favoring this leader more than they should. Because (semantic) priming of 
cognitive consistency has been shown to increase information distortion during a choice 
process (Russo et al., 2008),  the efficacy the new behavioral priming technique can be 
validated by finding for the same increase in ID.   
Verifying the influence of cognitive consistency on judgments: Experiments 4, 5, and 6 
We expected the impact of a desire for cognitive consistency to be observable in 
phenomena for which an individual may have the underlying goal of fitting together what is 
known and information that is newly acquired.  As such, our subsequent experiments 
examined whether cognitive consistency may be driving the impact of existing beliefs on 
information search (Experiment 4), of expectations on perceived experience (Experiment 5), 
and of desirability on likelihood judgments (Experiment 6).  
Experiment 4 tests the impact of cognitive consistency on biased information search, 
a bias sometimes referred to as selective exposure to information (Festinger, 1957; for a 
review, see Hart, 2009). As previous research has already shown that cognitive consistency is 
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a driver of the biased evaluation of incoming information, this investigation seemed liked a 
natural extension.   
Experiment 5 investigates the effect of an expectation on the judgment of actual 
experience (e.g., Lee, Frederick, & Ariely, 2006; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, & 
Rachlinski, 2011; Massey, Simmons, &Armor, 2011). In this phenomenon, sometimes 
termed selective perception, expectations are the established belief and perceived experience 
is the new information. Because it is natural to attempt to match expectations and experience, 
the goal of cognitive consistency seems a likely candidate for driving this matching process.  
Finally, Experiment 6 examines the impact of cognitive consistency on the 
desirability bias. This is the result of the desirability of an outcome influencing the judgment 
of its expected likelihood. This phenomenon has a substantial history (see the review by 
Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) and remains of current interest (e.g., Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 
2011). The essence of the argument for why cognitive consistency might contribute to the 
desirability bias is that so long as there is an active desire to seek consistency between two 
beliefs, there is a desire to reconcile the estimated likelihood of an event‘s outcome (the 
evaluation of new information, including information retrieved from memory) with the 
preference for that outcome (an established belief).  
 
Experiment 1: Response Times 
 
Participants 
For compensation of $10, 20 students took part in a computer-based experiment that 
was run in the laboratory of a large North American university. They were assigned randomly 
to the control condition or to the consistency priming condition.  
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Procedure 
Participants assigned to the consistency priming condition were given three minutes 
to answer a conundrum. They then watched a movie extract for 5 minutes. Participants in the 
control condition only watched the movie extract.  
All participants were then told that the next  task would test their concentration skills. 
They were instructed to read aloud, as quickly as possible, each of a series of common words 
appearing on a computer screen. Response times were recorded with the expectation that 
words related to consistency would be responded to more quickly.  This word-naming task is 
commonly used to assess the effect of priming (Abad, Noguera, & Ortells, 2003; de Groot, 
1985; Neely, 1991). It has also been used successfully in previous research on cognitive 
consistency (Russo et al., 2008).   
Two categories of six words each were presented to every participant. The first 
contained the words related to consistency: ( agreement, coherence, compatible, congruence, 
consistent, and fitting). The second category contained neutral words (above, collection, 
deepen, kitchen, overcome, underline) that were relatively unrelated to consistency. The 
neutral words provided a response time baseline for each participant.  
Results 
The dependent measure was the within-participant difference between the mean 
response time to the six consistency-related words and the mean to the six neutral words. 
Successful activation of the consistency goal should have yielded briefer response times to 
the consistency-related words (relative to the baseline of the neutral words) only in the 
priming condition.  
In the control group the within-participant difference in RT between words related to 
consistency and control words was 107.7 ms (SE = 14.85), a value significantly different 
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from zero (t (10) = 7.78, two-sided p < .0001). Thus, on average participants took longer to 
react to consistency-related words than to neutral words. Since the words in the two 
categories were of similar length,  this difference was assumed to come from an effect of 
word familiarity. Words such as ―kitchen‖ or ―above‖ were likely to be used more often than 
words such as ―coherence‖ or ―fitting‖.   
In the priming condition, the within-participant difference in RT between words 
related to consistency and control words was still positive, but less so (22.6 ms, SE = 21.93).  
A t-test between those two RT conditions confirmed the reliability of the expected difference 
between the priming  and control condition (t (18) = 3.28, two-sided p < .01).  
Thus, the greater accessibility of consistency-related words verified that cognitive 
consistency had been successfully activated as a goal. Yet, because word-naming might have 
reflected only a semantic effect and not an actual increase in motivation, the next study used 
an explicit measurement of goal activation. 
 
Experiment 2: Online Assessment of Goals 
 
Participants 
Through Amazon Mechanical Turk 60 participants were recruited. Each received a 
payment of 50 cents. Participants were assigned randomly to the control condition or to the 
consistency-primed condition. One participant who failed to follow instructions was 
excluded, leaving 59 respondents.  
Procedure 
 Following the priming phase, participants were first given definitions of four goals, 
consistency and three distracters. Carlson et al. (2010) argue that this pre-task familiarity with 
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the goals is needed to ensure that all participants share the same meaning of each goal and 
can recognize them when interrupted and asked to report their activation levels. Each 
participant read the following instructions: 
On the pages that follow, you will be asked to read and 
evaluate information that will help you make a decision 
between two products. During the choice process, you will 
be asked to report what strategies you are using to actually 
come to a decision. 
To be sure that you fully understand the meaning of a 
question that will be asked later in the study, please take 
some time to read out loud the four following definitions:  
 Conserve Effort: Save effort when examining or 
making judgments about the options. 
 Be consistent: See new information as consistent 
with information seen earlier. 
 Separate the options: Exploit differences between 
the options to separate them from each other.  
 Memorize: Commit the information seen to memory. 
Once you have read out loud the four definitions, you can 
start the study. Thanks in advance. 
Participants then completed a choice task between two resort hotels, using several 
product attributes as units of information. Midway through the choice process and again near 
its end, participants reported the activation level of each of the four goals on a scale from 0 
(not at all) to 100 (as much as possible).  
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Results 
The test for successful goal activation was the difference in the means of the self-
reported levels of consistency activation between the priming and the control conditions. 
Participants in the priming condition should have reported a higher mean level of activation. 
In the control group participants reported a mean  activation of the consistency goal of 
68.9 on the scale from 0 to 100 (SE = 4.79). This value suggested that the goal of cognitive 
consistency is always somewhat active in such a choice task. Note that the self-report method 
and the resulting mean activation also suggested that the activation of the goal of cognitive 
consistency is not all-or-none, but lies on a continuum (see Carlson et al., 2010). 
In the primed group participants reported a mean activation of the consistency goal of 
80.0 (SE = 3.65). A t-test revealed that this value was significantly above the control group‘s 
mean (t (57) = 1.83; one-sided p < .05). Thus, the greater activation level of the consistency 
goal in the primed condition verified that cognitive consistency had been successfully 
activated as a goal. 
  
Experiment 3: Information Distortion 
 
As a third and final test of the ability of the conundrum-based method to activate the 
goal of cognitive consistency, we sought a criterion task where the consistency goal had 
already been shown to drive an observable effect. Thus, the task was binary choice and the 
effect was the predecisional distortion of information to support an emerging preference 
(Russo et al. 2008). If the conundrum-driven priming of consistency could successfully 
increase information distortion, there would be a third validation of the method, this time in a 
more natural task, the choice between two alternatives. 
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Participants 
Participants were 70 students from a large North American university. They were paid 
$5 for a 30-minute session in a laboratory and assigned randomly to either the priming or 
control condition.  
Procedures 
After the priming phase, participants chose between two options (resort hotels) based 
on five narrative attributes presented sequentially (e.g., Meloy, Russo, & Miller, 2006). After 
reading each attribute, participants were asked three questions. The first was a rating of the 
diagnosticity of the attribute on a 9-point scale, where 1 meant ―strongly favors‖ one hotel, 9 
meant ―strongly favors‖ the other hotel, and 5 meant ―favors neither hotel‖. This response 
formed the basis of the measurement of information distortion. Second, participants were 
asked which alternative they would choose if they were to pick one at this stage, knowing 
that more information would be provided. This response identified the currently leading 
option. The third response was the participant‘s confidence in this leading option.  
Results 
The calculation of information distortion required two steps. To begin, a participant‘s 
estimate of an attribute‘s diagnostic value (on the 9-point scale) was compared to an unbiased 
evaluation of the same information that was pre-tested to be approximately 5, which meant 
that the information favored neither hotel. Second, the absolute difference between those two 
values was signed positively if the attribute‘s rating favored the leading alternative (which 
qualified as information distortion) and negatively if it favored the trailing one (which should 
only have occurred by chance). Note that if the confidence in the leading hotel was zero, no 
reliable leader existed and no estimate of ID could be computed. We expected participants 
with a higher activation level of the consistency goal to exhibit greater information distortion.  
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The results exhibited the same pattern as those from Experiments 1 and 2. The mean 
information distortion was significantly higher when consistency was activated (Mpriming = 
1.15 versus Mcontrol = .40; t (68) = 2.41; two-sided p < .05). Thus, the new behavioral priming 
method, resolving a difficult conundrum, succeeded in replicating the known effect of 
cognitive consistency on the biased evaluation of incoming information. 
 
Experiment 4: Selective Exposure 
 
We have argued that developing a method for priming cognitive consistency is 
potentially useful for explaining one underlying cause or mechanism of judgmental 
phenomena in general. The test of that value is the ability of the method to contribute to our 
understanding of multiple specific phenomena. With this in mind, we chose to study three 
well known phenomena where consistency has been predicted to, or might be expected to, 
play an important role, but where that role has not been tested until now. The first of these is 
selective exposure (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986).  
Participants 
One hundred and twenty participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and run online. Each participant was compensated 50 cents and randomly assigned to 
one of the two conditions. priming or control.  
Procedures 
Following the usual priming phase, the criterion task required participants to make a 
choice between buying and not buying a laptop based on an initial description and five user 
reviews.  
The initial information given was the following:  
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Your current laptop is getting old and crashes too often. You have 
very important data on your laptop and don‟t want to risk 
losing any of it in case your laptop breaks. Thus, you decide buy a 
new laptop.  
You have a budget of around $500 to spend, and it happens that 
there is a laptop for around that price that you are considering. 
(For the purposes of this study we have removed the name of the 
laptop and just labeled it X.) There are certainly other laptops 
that might be what you‟re looking for, and quite possibly better 
ones, but this one has caught your eye and you want to seriously 
evaluate it. Below is a description of the laptop that you want to 
evaluate. 
Laptop X $490 - $500 
 Battery life:  6 hours 
 Weight:  5.2 pounds 
 Processor:  1.6GHz Intel N270 Atom Processor 
Memory: 1 GB DDR2 RAM 
 Hard Drive:  80 GB SATA Hard Drive 
 Size:  14.2" 
 
After making their initial, tentative buy/ no buy decision, participants were told that 
they had to look at five pieces of information before making their final decision, after which 
they were free to reverse their decision or maintain it. These additional pieces of information 
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were consumer reviews, which could be extracted from one of four websites: a fan page, the 
company‘s website, a blog opposed to the laptop, or an online retailer website. The fan page 
and the company‘s website were described as likely to contain positive reviews. The blog and 
the online retailer were described as likely to contain negative reviews.  All four sites 
contained 5 reviews, and each of the total of 20 reviews was found online and written by an 
actual consumer. They were lightly edited for clarity and length.  
After making their final decision, participants were told that ―curiosity moves you to 
go online‖ where they were instructed to ―get three more pieces of information‖. These final 
three user reviews could be selected from the same four sources. Participants could not 
reverse their purchase decisions at this stage.  
Results 
Our interest was both what participants did after they had made their initial buy/no-
buy decision (when they were instructed to select five user reviews) and what they did after 
they had made their final decision (when they were instructed to select three additional user 
reviews). In each of these cases, the dependent measure was the proportion of reviews that 
were confirmatory. A review was coded ―confirmatory‖ if the participant had decided to buy 
(not to buy) the camera and it was selected from one of the two more positive (negative) 
sources. The opposite held for ―disconfirmatory‖.  
The argument for the effect of the desire for consistency applied to confirmatory 
search both before and after the final decision. The open question was whether the effect of 
priming the consistency goal would have a greater effect before or after that final decision. 
On the one hand, the priming effect of the conundrum may have faded after the initial choice 
phase, thereby reducing its effect after the final decision. On the other hand, the commitment 
to the decision to buy or not buy the laptop should have been greater after the final decision, 
55 
 
 
and that commitment might have combined with whatever priming effect was left to yield 
greater selective exposure after the final decision.  
 The results are displayed in Figure 2. Priming consistency yielded a significant 
increase in the overall proportion of confirming searches, confirming the findings of earlier 
studies (again see Hart et al., 2009). The results of a MANOVA confirmed the significant 
main effect of priming (F (1, 118) = 8.73; two-sided p < .05). The same MANOVA also 
revealed a main effect of time (F (1, 118) = 18.01; two-sided p < .01). Participants searched 
for significantly more confirming information after having made their final decision than 
after having made their initial decision. This result was fully compatible with the greater 
commitment after the final decision than before (when the tentative decision was reversible).  
The open question was whether the effect of priming consistency was greater before 
or after the final decision. The consistency-driven increase in selective exposure was 
observed both before and after the final decision was made (Prop priming-after initial = .55 versus 
Prop control – after initial = .47, and Prop priming-after final = .70 versus Prop control – after final = .59).  The 
interaction effect between priming and time was not significant (F(1, 118) = .26, two-sided p 
> .60). Thus, primed participants tended to look for about the same amount more confirming 
information than the controls, whether that search occurred before or after the final decision.  
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Overall, our results confirmed the earlier work showing that cognitive consistency 
drives, at least partly, the process that underlies the post-choice bias in the search for 
information that supports  a decision (commonly known as selective exposure). However, 
that result is extended methodologically, by using a general priming method rather than ones 
that are task-specific. 
 
Experiment 5: Judgment influenced by expectations 
 
We now investigate whether it also has the power to increase the extent to which 
expectations bias our judgments.  
Participants 
The study was run online through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The 160 participants 
were each paid 50 cents. They were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions.  
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Procedures 
After the same priming phase, participants were told that they were about to watch 
movie trailers and rate them. Four trailers were selected for movies that had not yet been 
released at the time of the experiment: Don‘t be afraid of the Dark, Transformers - Dark of 
the Moon, Winnie the Pooh, and the Dilemma. Prior to viewing them, participants read each 
one‘s title, a list of the main actors, and a synopsis of the plot. Based on this information, they 
were asked to rate how much they expected to like each movie‘s trailer on a scale from 0 (not 
at all) to 100 (very much). After watching all four movie trailers in a randomized order, 
participants rated how much they actually liked each one on the same 0-to-100 scale. 
Results 
The first criterion for the effect of consistency was a disagreement score, the absolute 
value of the difference between the rated expectation and actual experience, averaged across 
the four movies. Lower scores meant lower disagreement, which in turn meant a greater 
influence of the expectation on the reported liking. We predicted that increased activation of 
the desire for consistency in the primed group would lead to lower disagreement scores.  The 
mean disagreement score in this condition was 19.1 (SE = 1.20), compared to 21.9 (SE = 
1.21) in the control condition. The difference between these two scores was statistically 
reliable (t (158) = 1.66; one-sided p < .05).  
We then assessed the effect of priming cognitive consistency on the disagreement 
score independently for each movie. A MANOVA yielded the expected main effect of 
priming (F (1, 158) = 2.77, one-sided p < .05) and also showed an unexpected marginal effect 
of the type of movie (F (3, 156) = 2.27; two-sided p < .10). This marginal effect was due to a 
higher disagreement rate for the movie Winnie the Pooh. Although participants expected to 
dislike its movie trailer (Winnie-exp = 47.75, SE = 2.14), they actually really enjoyed it (Winnie-
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real = 62.6, SE = 2.36), resulting a higher disagreement score. Note though that the interaction 
effect between priming and type of movie was far from significant (F(3, 156) = .93, two-
sided p < .50). Therefore, the effect of priming the goal of cognitive consistency did not 
differ reliably across movies (see Figure 3) 
 
 
 
These results showed that the influence of expectation on perception is driven at least 
partially by the desire for consistency.  
 
Experiment 6: Desirability Bias 
 
As our final investigation of the influence of cognitive consistency on judgmental 
phenomena, we examined the desirability bias (see the review by Krizan & Windschitl, 
2007). This is the often documented effect of the preference for an event on the estimated 
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likelihood of that event. For a desired event, its likelihood is often elevated, while for 
undesired events it is decreased. We raise the possibility that a desire to make the outcome 
and its likelihood more consistent may contribute to this bias.  
Participants 
The study was run online through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The 147 participants 
were each paid 50 cents.  
Procedures 
Participants were first assigned randomly to the control condition or to the 
consistency priming condition. They were then asked to make a series of six predictions 
regarding the 83
rd
 Academy Awards winners, held in February 2011. Note that the study was 
run in January 2011, near enough to the awards themselves that the actual list of nominees 
could be used.   
The instructions were the following: 
 For each of the six major Academy Award categories listed 
below, please predict the winner to the best of your ability and 
knowledge. This is the nominee that you believe will win, 
regardless of whether they should win.  
The six categories were: best actress, best actor, best supporting actor, best supporting 
actress, best director, and best picture. For instance, for the category best actor, the 
participants answered the following question:  
Which nominee do you predict will win Best Actor?  
 Colin Firth (The King's Speech)  
 James Franco (127 Hours)  
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 Javier Bardem (Biutiful)  
 Jeff Bridges (True Grit)  
 Jesse Eisenberg (The Social Network) 
After making all six predictions, participants were asked to indicate which nominees they 
would actually like to see win. The instructions, adapted for each category, were:  
Now please tell us the nominee that you would most like to see win 
the Academy Award, regardless of their chance of winning. This is 
the nominee that you hope wins, that would most please you if they 
do win, completely independent of whether they actually will win. 
Which nominee would you most prefer to win Best Actor?  
 Colin Firth (The King's Speech)  
 James Franco (127 Hours)  
 Javier Bardem (Biutiful)  
 Jeff Bridges (True Grit)  
 Jesse Eisenberg (The Social Network) 
Results 
 The dependent measure was the number of predictions that matched the participant‘s 
preferences, a number between 0 and 6 that amounts to an agreement score between 
preferences and likelihoods. Our expectation was that priming consistency would yield a 
higher agreement score.  
Results confirmed this expectation. In the control condition the number of matches 
averaged  2.26 (SE = .16). In the priming condition, the average number of matches increased 
to 3.05 (SE = .18).  This difference was highly significant (t (145) = 3.28; two-sided p < 
.001).  
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 A MANOVA was performed with type of prize category as a repeated-measure factor 
and priming as the second factor. Both main effects were significant. First, the significance of 
the difference between conditions (F(1, 145) = 10.81, two-sided p < .005) was confirmed. 
Second, a difference between prize categories was also observed (F(5,141) = 4.14, two-sided 
p < .005), due an overall higher agreement for the category Best Actress (largely dominated 
by Natalie Portman in 2011). However no interaction effect between prize category and 
condition was found, meaning that the priming effect did not differ significantly across 
categories (F(5, 141) = 1.59, two-sided p >.15).   
 
Discussion 
 
The present research demonstrates that cognitive consistency can be activated as a 
goal by a relatively straightforward behavioral priming task. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 verified 
that our conundrum-based method successfully primes consistency. Experiment 4, 5, and 6 
demonstrate that the desire for cognitive consistency drives three well-known phenomena of 
human judgment: selective exposure or the bias to search for confirming information after a 
decision, selective perception or the influence of expectations on judgment, and the 
desirability bias. 
The main objectives of the present work were to introduce and validate the 
conundrum-based method and then to demonstrate its applicability to some familiar tasks. 
One natural next step is to use the method to better understand other phenomena, including 
attempts to test for the role of cognitive consistency in tasks where this goal has already been 
proposed as a candidate explanation. With this in mind, the following additional phenomena 
are proposed.  
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Other phenomena that may be driven by cognitive consistency 
Consistency within social groups: social influence. Early research on cognitive 
consistency was related to consistency within social networks. Social influence, defined as an 
influence exerted by a group on a peer to follow the normative rules of the group is an area in 
which a pressure to reach consensus can be observed. The result is often a change in beliefs 
or behavior to match the norms of the group. Berns, Capra, Moore and Noussair (2009) used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the neural mechanisms associated 
with social influence among adolescents in the domain of music. They measured both 
judgments of preference and neurobiological responses to clips of songs, with and without the 
overall popularity of the song revealed. They show a main effect of popularity on the 
participant‘s song attitudes, and the fMRI results suggest that a principal mechanism whereby 
popularity ratings affect consumer choice is through “the anxiety generated by the mismatch 
between one's own preferences and others. This mismatch anxiety motivates people to switch 
their choices in the direction of the consensus. Our data suggest that this is a major force 
behind the conformity observed in music tastes in some teenagers.” As a result, this research 
shows that inconsistency creates anxiety, which further drives a need to match one‘s 
preferences to those of one‘s social group. This result is in line with the hypothesis that social 
influence may be driven by the goal of cognitive consistency.  
Assimilation vs. Contrast Effects. Assimilation and contrast effects (Sherif & 
Hovland, 1961) might also be considered a consistency-related phenomenon. This theory 
posits that there are zones (or latitudes) of acceptance and rejection in individuals‘ 
perceptions. If the discrepancy between beliefs and incoming information is small enough, it 
will fall into the consumer's latitude of acceptance, and the individual will tend to assimilate 
the difference. If the discrepancy is too large, it enters in a zone of rejection, and the 
individual magnifies the perceived disparity creating a contrast effect. An activated goal of 
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consistency may increase the zone of acceptance and boost assimilation effects in comparison 
to contrast effects. This prediction is consistent with research done in the context of the 
violation of expectations by Anderson (1973). Fitting dissonance theory predictions, his 
results verify that if the discrepancy between consumer expectations and actual product 
performance is too high, it will cause a less favorable evaluation of a product than a 
somewhat lower level of disparity. It would be interesting to check whether activating a goal 
of consistency would actually increase assimilation effects, possibly by widening the 
acceptance zone.  
Hindsight Bias. The hindsight bias relies on the outcome of a past event to provide 
important information that is difficult to ignore. Then the estimated likelihood of that 
outcome, estimated as if the outcome were not known, is biased to accord with the outcome. 
Of course, the challenge in avoiding any hindsight bias is to ignore the knowledge of ―what 
really happened‖. The prediction is that cognitive consistency contributes to the retrospective 
fitting of the estimated likelihood with the known outcome. 
There is no reason for the above list of phenomena to be exhaustive.  For instance, 
might the representativeness heuristic or anchoring and underadjustment be influenced by the 
goal of cognitive consistency? Might the same be said for the confirmation bias (Nickerson 
1998) and the foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman and Fraser, 1966)? The proposed method 
for priming cognitive consistency is not meant to be specific to any phenomenon. It should be 
able to be used to investigate the role of cognitive consistency in many phenomena.  
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PAPER 3: THE INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATIVE REASONING ON JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION-MAKING 
 
A growing body of literature views human judgment and decision-making as the 
product of one of two underlying systems of reasoning (Epstein, 1973; Evans & Over, 1996; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The evidence for the 
existence of two systems usually stems from the capacity of the human mind to exhibit 
simultaneous contradictory responses from a single reasoning problem, called Criterion S by 
Sloman (1996). A well-known example of the existence of Criterion S is known as the Linda-
the-bank-teller problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 2002). In this task, 
participants are first asked to read the following description of a hypothetical person:  
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. 
As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
justice, and she participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.  
Participants are then asked to rank order the probability of eight statements about 
Linda, including: 
Linda is a bank teller 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement 
 The rules of probability theory require the second of the above statements be less 
likely than the first because it has an additional requirement. However, a large majority of 
participants mistakenly rank it ahead of the first. This error in logical reasoning about 
probabilities is usually attributed to the ―representativeness heuristic‖, a rule of thumb by 
which judgments of probabilities rely on similarity relations. Because Linda‘s description is 
more similar to a feminist bank teller than to a typical bank teller, the second statement is 
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judged more likely than the first. In other words, probability rules provide one response, 
while reliance on the representativeness heuristic provides another. This is exactly the type of 
situation from which the existence of two systems of reasoning is sometimes inferred. 
 The labels of these two systems have varied across authors. I use the most neutral 
terms proffered in the literature, System 1 and System 2 processes (Stanovich, 1999, 2004; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). System 1 is generally assumed to be a default process (Evans, 
2008), by which fast and automatic answers are given. For instance, in the Linda problem, 
System 1 would automatically trigger the response ―Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement‖. System 2 is usually considered an ―overriding process‖ by which the 
automatic answers of System 1 are inhibited. System 2 is usually considered slow and 
controlled. In the Linda problem, System 2 would be responsible for overriding the first 
intuitive answer and replacing it by the correct response ―Linda is a bank teller‖. 
The demonstration of the existence of two systems based on evidence from Criterion 
S has been challenged (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Osman, 2004; Keren and Schul, 
2009). The main focus of these debates is the number of systems that might actually exist, 
viz., a single continuous system (e.g., Osman, 2004), the familiar two systems (all dual-
reasoning theories), or potentially more than two (Evans, 2009). The purpose of the paper is 
not to resolve the debate about the number of reasoning systems.  
Following Keren and Schul (2009), I question the conclusions drawn from studies run 
in a dual-reasoning paradigm.  Thinking of System 1 as a ―default‖ system that System 2 can 
override in specific conditions has had two important intertwined and pervasive implications 
on the study of human reasoning.  
The most manifest implication has been methodological. Most researchers interested 
in studying System 1 have limited themselves to inhibiting System 2 in order to study System 
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1. Two of the most widely used methods to prevent the use of System 2 are the imposition of 
a cognitive load and the time pressure of quick answers (e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999; 
Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 Evans & Curtis-Holmes 2005; De Neys, 2006). 
These techniques succeed because System 2 has been shown to be limited by working 
memory and to be slow (for a review see Evans, 2008). As a result, imposing either a 
cognitive load or a time limit restricts the capacities of System 2 and should reduce its ability 
to override the responses of System 1. In other words, the methodology most commonly 
employed to study System 1 has relied on the assumption: Shut down System 2, and then 
only System 1 is left.  
The second assumption is theoretical. If System 1 is defined as the ―default‖ of 
System 2, and studied methodologically as ―the inhibition of System 2‖, then the only valid 
conclusions that can be drawn from such studies is that ―not- System 2‖ is driving their main 
effects. Inferring that whatever is ―not-System 2‖ is a single unitary system, namely System 
1, may not be justified and lead instead false conclusions. Keren and Schul (2009) illustrate 
this idea with a short description of the ―not-the-liver‖ fallacy (Bedford, 1997). In this 
analogy, a physician from the 18
th
 century claims to have discovered two organs. The first is 
the liver, which clears toxins from the blood. The second, called ―not the liver‖, has for main 
functions blood circulation, nutrient absorption, waste expulsion, and protection from foreign 
invaders. The argument for the existence of the ―not the liver organ‖ is that, ―for when the 
liver is removed, the body is still able to do all these things and more, until such time as the 
toxin buildup is fatal‖ (p.231). In this case, the fallacy is to conclude that what is left after the 
removal of the liver is one single organ. In the case of dual-reasoning theories, the fallacy is 
to think that what is left after the inhibition of System 2 is a single unitary system, or System 
1.  
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More specifically, after inhibition of System 2 three ―not-System 2‖ alternatives are 
possible: 
- An actual unitary System 1, as assumed by dual-reasoning theorists 
- One system, but with several distinct characteristics (e.g., holistic, associative,…) 
that require abandoning the assumption of a unitary system 
- Several systems, with their own sets of characteristics (e.g., System 3 is holistic, 
System 4 is experiential,…) 
The purpose of this paper is not to specify what ―not-System 2‖ actually is and how it 
works, which may remain a debated topic for some time before it can be resolved. In the 
―not-the-liver‖ fallacy described above, the second organ is known to perform several 
functions (e.g., blood circulation, nutrient absorption, etc.). Similarly, ―not-System 2‖ has 
been described as associative, evolutionarily old, domain-specific, universal, contextualized, 
pragmatic, experiential, parallel, stereotypical, rapid, implicit, automatic, instinctive, 
effortless, non verbal, and holistic (for an exhaustive list, see Evans, 2008 – Table 2, p. 257). 
I chose not to  assume that these attributes describe a single unitary system. Instead, I focus 
on the study of only one dimension, associative processing, as if the interest of ―not-the-liver‖ 
were only on blood circulation. Said differently, this paper does not try to inhibit System 2 in 
order to infer the consequences of a hypothetical unitary System 1 on information processing. 
Rather, it attempts to prime one dimension commonly attributed to System 1 and investigate 
how this priming influences human reasoning.  
Priming Associations 
One of the oldest and most recognized dimensions attributed to System 1 is its 
associative properties. For instance, Sloman (1996, p.4) defines it as ―associative because its 
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computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity‖. Similarly, 
Kahneman defines System 1 as an ―associative machine‖ (2011).  
However, even this seminal dimension of System 1 has recently been questioned by 
Mitchell, De Houwer, and Lovibond (2009).  The authors distinguish between two meanings 
of associative learning. The first meaning is the phenomenon of associative learning, that is, 
the capacity to learn that two or more events are related to each other. The second meaning 
focuses on the psychological mechanism underlying associative processes. The authors argue 
against the traditional view of associative learning by the dual-system approach, according to 
which associative learning can result from controlled processes but also from the automatic 
formation of links between mental representations. Instead, they claim that associative 
learning depends only on effortful and attention-demanding reasoning processes, based on the 
hypothesis testing of propositions. Take the classic empirical demonstration of associative 
learning by Pavlov (1927). If the mechanism underlying associative reasoning indeed stems 
from an automatic formation of links between mental representations, then the dog learns that 
the bell brings food by forming a link between the mental representation of the bell and the 
food. When the bell rings, it activates the mental representation of food. If the mechanism 
underlying associative reasoning, instead, stems from hypothesis testing, then the proposition 
tested by the dog is ―When I hear a bell, I shall receive food‖. This hypothesis is learned and 
retained in memory, and becomes a belief that is held with more or less confidence. Note that 
these two views of associative learning make very different predictions. For instance, if 
associative learning always requires controlled processes, then people should be able to 
report their reasoning, i.e., to report what hypothesis they are testing and the strength with 
which they hold it. In contrast, if associative learning is the result of an automatic process, 
people may not be able to report the strategy that they are using. A second prediction is that, 
if learning is effortful, it should be hampered when cognitive resources are depleted.  
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In this exploratory paper, my goal is neither to challenge the common assumption that 
System 1 is per se associative, nor to contribute to the related debate about whether 
associative reasoning relies on automatic and/or controlled processes. Instead, I attempt only 
to answer the following question: How does associative reasoning impact judgment and 
decision-making?  
The intended contribution of this paper is two-fold: 
 Methodologically, proposing an alternative to methods that inhibit System 2 
 Theoretically, disentangling effects from associative reasoning from effects 
potentially caused by other ―not-System 2‖ dimensions (e.g., holistic 
reasoning or experiential reasoning) 
The necessary first step is to find a method for priming an associative type of 
reasoning in a laboratory setting. Recent research on mindsets provides insights on how this 
might be accomplished.  
Priming an Associative Mindset 
A mindset is defined as a cognitive or behavioral procedure that is associated with a 
particular goal. For instance, Xu and Wyer (2008) studied the comparison mindset, that is, the 
cognitive procedure associated with the goal of comparing two or more objects. A 
characteristic of a mindset is that, once activated, it is then more likely to be used 
subsequently, even in a different domain, and even without the activation of its associated 
goal. For instance, Xu and Wyer (2008) have shown that comparing animals makes people 
more likely in a subsequent task to buy a product because they have automatically started to 
compare the available products. In a similar fashion, thinking of yourself as interdependent 
makes you more likely to see objects in relation to others in a display (Kühnen & Oyserman, 
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2002), and generating reasons why a proposition is not true leads to a less favorable 
evaluation of a product (Xu, 2010) 
Activating an associative mindset means finding a task that requires the repeated use 
of an associative process (Wyer &Xu, 2010). Repetition of such a task should build 
momentum for that associative procedure. As a consequence, associative reasoning should be 
more likely to be used in a subsequent, unrelated task.  
The first associative mindset activation task I developed involved brand associations. 
Participants are asked to pair sequentially 10 brands with 20 personality traits. Brands and 
traits were extracted from previous research on brand personality (Aaker, 1997). The 
instructions were: 
On the pages that follow, you will be presented with 10 brands. For 
each of the 10 brands presented, drag and drop the personality 
traits (on the left) that you think describe it best. There is no right 
or wrong answer. Please answer according to your own personal 
judgment. You can drag and paste as many items as you want. 
For two reasons a second task was developed to priming an associative mindset. The 
first was to check that any results obtained would not be confined to brand associations. The 
second was to investigate whether the type of associations activated in the priming phase 
matters. More specifically, the process of associating a brand with some personality traits is 
known to be largely impacted by marketing strategies and constructed through classical 
conditioning. Brand associations are thus learned as a social phenomenon, with those 
associations shared across the population (Aaker, 1997). The second priming method aimed 
at activating associations that were not learned by societal construction but instead would be 
idiosyncratic to the participant. 
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In this second priming task participants are told that the objective of the first part of 
the experiment is to study synesthesia. They read a brief description of the phenomenon, 
followed by the following instructions:  
On the next pages, you will be presented with 15 different first names (e.g., 
John). Each time, pick the color on the right that you consider best fits the 
name on the left. You can only pick one color for each name. There is no right 
answer, so please answer according to your own personal judgment.  
In both priming methods, actual answers are not important. Their only purpose is to 
activate an associative procedure or mindset, in order to determine whether this activation 
would impact reasoning in an immediately following and unrelated choice task.  
 
Experiment 1: The availability heuristic 
 
I first looked for a dependent variable that has been explicitly claimed to be caused by 
associative reasoning. One such phenomenon is the availability heuristic.  
The availability heuristic refers to ―a tendency to form a judgment on the basis of 
what is readily brought to mind (Medin & Ross, 1997, p. 522).‖ For instance, suppose that 
you open the last book you have read and pick a word randomly. Is this word more likely to 
start with R or to have R as its third letter? A majority of respondents tend to answer that R is 
the first letter is more likely. The reason advanced for this result is based on ―associative 
distance” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1972). The availability heuristic is used when 
probabilities are assessed based on the ease with which associations are brought to mind. The 
shorter the associative distance, the easier it is to recall associations. The longer is the 
associative distance, the tougher it is to recall associations. People use ease of recall as a 
proxy for estimating probabilities of occurrence.  
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Design 
Forty-five participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid 75 
cents for their participation in an experiment on decision-making. They were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions: control, brand-personality associations, and name-color 
associations. Participants in the control group were instructed to read a brief description of 
the Burgess Shale fossil fields (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burgess_Shale). 
After the associative priming phase, participants were asked whether more deaths per 
year in the United States were caused by accidents (of all kinds) or strokes. Accidents are 
typically easier to retrieve, and, thus, following Kahneman‘s terminology, are more 
associatively close. However, strokes actually cause more annual deaths than accidents in the 
United States. If my two associative priming methods work, there should have been an 
increased proportion of participants selecting accidents instead of strokes in comparison to 
the control group. 
Results 
The results revealed an overwhelming effect of both methods of associative priming 
(see Figure 4). Participants in the brand-personality and name-color conditions chose 
―Accidents‖ 93% and 80% of the time, respectively. In comparison, this rate was only 40% in 
the control group.  A logit model yielded a significant impact of condition (Chi-Square (2, 
N=45) = 11.5, p < .01). In addition, planned comparisons revealed that both primed 
conditions differed significantly from the control group (Chi-Square (1, N= 45) = 10.6 for 
brand associations; Chi-Square (1, N = 45) = 5.2 for color associations; Bonferroni-corrected 
two-sided ps < .05) 
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Priming an associative mindset increased the number of ―associatively close‖ 
answers, that is, increased reliance on the availability heuristic. Because both priming 
conditions yielded similar effects, I considered them as interchangeable. Thus, I used only 
one or the other in all of the following experiments.  
 
Experiment 2: The representativeness heuristic 
 
The second phenomenon investigated in this paper has also been linked to associative 
reasoning.  The representativeness heuristic, briefly illustrated in the introduction, refers to a 
tendency to evaluate the likelihood of an event by the degree to which it is similar in essential 
characteristics to its parent population (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). Linda‘s description is 
more similar to a feminist bank teller than to a typical bank teller, thus Linda is judged more 
likely to be a feminist bank teller. The reason advanced for this phenomenon is based on the 
properties of associative thought: ―The primary reason for this is that the degree to which as 
association is operative is proportional to the similarity between the current stimulus and 
previously associated stimulus (…) Associative thought uses temporal and similarity relations 
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to draw inferences and make predictions that approximate those of a sophisticated 
statistician (Sloman, 2002, p. 381).‖ 
Design 
One hundred and thirty participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and paid 75 cents for their participation in an experiment on decision-making. They were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: control versus priming. The name-color 
associative task was used to prime the associative mindset. 
Following the priming phase, participants were asked to read the description of the 
hypothetical person Linda given in the introduction of this paper. They were then asked to 
rank order the likelihood of eight of her possible occupations (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1983), including ―Linda is a bank teller‖ and ―Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement‖.  
Results 
The first analysis had for its dependent variable the proportion of participants who 
ranked ―Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement‖ as more likely than 
―Linda is a bank teller‖, indicating the use of the representativeness heuristic. Even though 
proportions trended in the expected direction, this first analysis did not yield a significant 
difference, as both groups showed a clear tendency to exhibit the expected bias (Pcontrol = 
72.4% vs. Pprimed = 79.6%, two-sided p-value > .30).  
The second analysis had as its dependent measure the average difference in ranking 
between the feminist version and the non-feminist version. For instance, if the feminist 
version was ranked 7
th
 and the non-feminist version ranked 8
th
, the within-subject ranking 
difference was 1. If the feminist version was ranked 8
th
 and the non-feminist version ranked 
7
th
, the within-subject ranking difference was -1. If participants in the primed group relied 
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more on the representativeness heuristic than participants in the control group, they should 
have ranked  Linda as a feminist bank teller significantly higher than the less stereotypical 
alternative of Linda as a bank teller with no more said. This was indeed the case. The average 
difference between the two ranks in the control group was .77, against 1.48 in the primed 
group ( t (129) = 2.09, two-sided p-value <.05).  In addition, note that the mean difference 
observed in the control group (.80) was, as expected, significantly different from 0 (t (65) = 
3.64, two-sided p-value <.001) . This last result confirmed that participants tend to rank the 
feminist version ahead of the non-feminist one. Priming an associative mindset significantly 
increased this tendency.  
 
Experiment 3: The sunk cost fallacy 
 
I then sought a phenomenon for which causes are still under debate, but which could 
be impacted by an associative mindset. One such phenomenon is the sunk cost bias, 
manifested as ―a greater tendency to continue and endeavor once an investment in money, 
effort, or time has been made. (Arkes & Blumer, 1985, p. 124).‖ In other words, people 
frequently face situations in which they need to reverse decisions or change behaviors in 
order to avoid negative consequences. However, people often fail to terminate their original 
commitment because of the already sunk investment of money or time. 
As a post-hoc explanation for this fallacy, Arkes and Blumer (1985) proposed that the 
desire not to waste resources that have been used is the psychological justification for this 
behavior. More recently, Arkes and Ayton (1999) gave further credence to this potential 
explanation by comparing the sunk cost fallacy in adults, young children, and animals. Since 
animals and young children do not show evidence of the fallacy while older adults do, they 
conclude that the sunk cost bias must be due to the learning and overgeneralization of a 
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―don‘t waste rule‖. The logic underlying this hypothesis is that during their lives humans are 
exposed to many admonitions against waste (e.g., from parents, ―don‘t waste your food‖ and 
―clean your plate or you won‘t get desert‖). Thus they associate the act of wasting with 
negative feedback and overgeneralize the rule to situations in which it does not apply. Even 
though this explanation appears reasonable, laboratory evidence supporting it is scarce and 
other potential explanations exist (see Arkes and Blumer, 1985). 
 My work intends to contribute to this research stream by examining the impact of 
priming associations on the sunk cost fallacy. If priming associations indeed increases the 
sunk cost bias, it means that the activation of some kind of learned associations is one of its 
drivers.  
Design 
Ninety participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid 75 
cents for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: control 
or associative mindset. The name-color associative task was used to prime the associative 
mindset. 
After the usual priming phase, each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
two following conditions. In the sunk cost condition (SC), participants were asked whether 
they were willing to continue to complete an endeavor in which they had previously invested.  
In the no sunk cost condition (NSC), participants were asked whether they were willing to 
continue to complete the same endeavor, but this time without any previous personal 
investment.  
The two versions of the problem are as follows (Arkes & Blumer, 1985):  
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Sunk cost version: Your family pays $200 for tickets to a basketball game to 
be played 60 miles from your home. Unfortunately, on the day of the game 
there is a snowstorm. Would you still go to the game?   
No sunk cost version: Your family was given free tickets worth $200 to a 
basketball game to be played 60 miles from your home. Unfortunately, on the 
day of the game there is a snowstorm. Would you still go to the game?  
In each case, participants were asked to respond either by Yes or No.  
 
The results are displayed in Table 1. The control group and the primed group did not 
show any difference in their answers to the no-sunk cost problem, so they were averaged 
(32%) to provide a baseline level to which the two other groups could be compared.  
Forty-five percent of the participants in the control-SC condition exhibited the sunk 
cost fallacy. This 13% increase from the baseline was only marginally significant (one-sided 
p < .15). In the associative mindset-SC condition, 74% of the participants decided they would 
still go to the game. This 42% increase in proportion from the control proved to be significant 
(Chi-Square (1, N = 90) = 11.5, two-sided p < .01).   
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Experiment 4: Mental models 
 
My  last study is more exploratory. It attempts to investigate the impact of associative 
processing on deductive reasoning that involves mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Mackiewicz & Johnson-laird, 2012). Mental models are 
“psychological representations of real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations (…) They have 
a structure that corresponds to the structure of what they represent” (Johnson-Laird, Girotto, 
& Legrenzi, 1998, p.1). Interestingly, Sloman (1996) categorized deductive reasoning as a 
form of rule-based reasoning that would not be based on associative processing. However, a 
number of mental model theorists have since described the formation of initial simplified 
models, usually representing what is true at the expense of what is false, as a relatively 
automatic and effortless process. However, the process of searching for counter-examples 
(sometimes referred to as ―fully explicit models‖) is usually described as more effortful and 
limited by working memory capacity (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002).  
As an illustration, consider the following assertion: ―John is in the same place as Jane 
if and only if Jane is in the same place as Mike.‖ Is it possible that John and Mike are the 
only two in the same place? A majority of respondents tend to mistakenly answer that it is not 
possible, because they mentally represent first John at the same place as Jane and then Mike, 
who has to be at the same place as Jane. They then incorrectly infer that the three characters 
have to be in the same place. This reasoning is insufficient as it only represents the ―truth‖, 
and fails to look for counter-examples. For instance, the three characters could be at three 
different locations. Alternatively, Jane could be alone, and Mike and John could be standing 
together.  
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This type of faulty reasoning has, to my knowledge, never specifically been attributed 
to associative reasoning. However, it has been explicitly linked to dual-reasoning by Osman 
(2004): “Johnson-Laird and Byrne‟s (1991) mental models theory proposes that the initial 
construction of representations is often incomplete, but with time or the appropriate context 
they become „fleshed out,‟ leading to correct responses. Thus, it predicts that increasing the 
time to think about the task encourages participants to expand the number of representations, 
which alternatively describes the changes from heuristic to analytic processes”. Therefore, I 
decided to investigate whether the mere priming of an associate mindset would increase 
reliance on initial mental models, independently of time pressure or cognitive load. 
Design 
Fifty participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and paid 75 cents for 
their participation. They were randomly assigned to the control condition or to the associative 
mindset condition. Participants in the associative mindset condition were asked to pair 10 
existing brands with potential personality traits.  
Participants were then asked to make four inferences about possibilities from a 
compound premise (Mackiewicz and Johnson-Laird, 2012).  
The generic structure was a follows: 
A is in the same place as B if and only if B is in the same place as C.  
 Illusory Question: Is it possible that A and C are the only 2 in the same place? 
(Correct Answer: Yes) 
 Control Question: Is it possible that A and B are the only 2 in the same place? 
(Correct Answer: No) 
A is in the same place as B if and only if B is not in the same place as C.  
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 Illusory Question: Is it possible that B and C are in the same place? (Correct 
Answer: Yes) 
 Control Question Is it possible that A is not in the same place as C? (Correct 
Answer: Yes) 
The premise always contained three individuals, in the order A-B and B-C in the two 
clauses. Two of the inferences were ―control‖ questions because the use of initial mental 
models yielded the correct answer. The other two inferences were ―illusory‖ questions 
because mental models yielded incorrect answers and the use of fully explicit models was 
necessary to obtain the correct response.  
Note that the letters A, B, and C were replaced by different first names in each of the  
four questions, and that the order of the four questions was randomized. In addition, I 
recorded the time participants spent answering each of the four questions and individual 
differences in intuitive and analytical information processing (Epstein et al., 1996).  
Construction of a Bias Index 
To be able to capture within-subject differences, a bias index was computed for each 
participant. This index was the difference in the number of correct answers to control versus 
illusory questions: the higher the index, the less bias was observed. Each participant 
answered 4 questions, which meant that the belief index could take five possible values: -2,   
-1, 0, 1 and 2. A score of 0 meant a total absence of bias, as the number of correct answers to 
the illusory questions is the same as the number of correct answers to the control questions. A 
positive score (1 or 2) meant the participant answered illusory questions more accurately than 
control questions, which is often the case. A negative score (-1 or -2) meant the opposite.  
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Results 
Results are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 4. They confirmed that participants 
primed with an associative mindset were overall more likely to score negatively on the bias 
index. 
 
First, the mean numbers of correct answers across conditions were compared. Results 
yielded a marginal effect of condition (Mcontrol =  -.24 vs. Mpriming=  -.60, t (49) = 1.42, one-
sided p = .08).  
Second, a logit model was constructed with the presence of bias as a binary dependent 
variable, and condition (control versus associative mindset), time spent on the task, and 
individual differences as independent variables. Results yielded a significant effect of 
condition (Chi-Square (1, N=50) = 4.7, p-value < .05), a marginal effect of the time spent on 
the task (one-sided p-value > .15), and no effect of individual differences (p-value > .30). 
Note that the marginal effect of time trended in the expected direction, i.e., participants who 
spend more time on the task showed less bias. In addition, note that the time spent on the task 
did not differ reliably across groups (Tcontrol = 92.2 s vs. Tcontrol = 93.4 s, p-value > .30).  
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Overall, results showed that priming an associative process increased reliance on 
simplified mental models. In addition, participants who were primed with associations did not 
spend more time on the task. As a result, it seemed like the process of relying on mental 
models that are representing the truth might be driven by associative reasoning.  
 
Discussion 
Summary of  findings 
Studies 1 and 2 show that the priming of an associative mindset increases reliance on 
the availability heuristic and the representativeness heuristic, strengthening the existing 
evidence that automatic associations hinder the use of analytical reasoning. Study 3 
demonstrates that the sunk cost fallacy is more likely to occur when associative reasoning is 
activated, highlighting that the use of learned associations may be at the origin of this bias. 
Finally, Study 4 demonstrates that priming associations increases the likelihood of relying on 
an initial mental model instead of looking for counter-examples.  
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Implications 
 Two conclusions may be drawn from this research: 
- Theoretically, mere associative processing leads to at least some of the biases in 
judgment and decision-making. 
- Methodologically, associative reasoning can be primed directly through the priming 
of an associative mindset.  
Interestingly, my last experiment recorded the time spent on the task and failed to 
demonstrate that participants primed with associative reasoning spent less time working on 
the criterion task than participants in the control group. This result seems to open the door to 
two complementary hypotheses that may be worth testing in future experiments: (a) 
associative reasoning may interfere with the System 2‘s inhibitory role; and (b). associative 
processing may not always be faster than System 2. 
Future Research 
 It would be interesting in future research to see whether the activation of other 
dimensions of System 1 (e.g., holistic reasoning, experiential reasoning) would trigger the 
same results as my associative priming. For instance, if some phenomena are activated by 
associative reasoning but not by holistic reasoning, it may mean that System 1 may not be as 
unitary as some have assumed. 
Alternatively, it may be interesting to compare whether a method using inhibition of 
System 2 (with a cognitive load or a time limit) and the new methods of associative priming 
actually produce the same effects. Preliminary results in the domain of information distortion 
show that this equivalence may not be the case. Predecisional information distortion (ID) is 
the biased evaluation of new information to support an emerging preference or belief. 
Specifically, during a choice process, as one alternative naturally emerges as the tentative 
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leader, individuals typically interpret incoming information as favoring this leader more than 
they should. Recent research by Polman and Russo (2012) shows that the use of a cognitive 
load significantly increases information distortion. I have collected preliminary data showing 
that priming an associative mindset does not increase ID. It would be interesting to compare 
in a single study the impact of these two methods and determine when they do and do not 
contribute to obtaining similar results. 
 Finally, other phenomena may be caused by associative reasoning, such as cause and 
consequence matching (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012), decision framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981; Svenson & Benson, 1993), the belief bias (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), and 
anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In addition, it may be interesting to see whether 
priming an associative mindset may be able to facilitate learning. Most of learning is indeed 
associative and priming associations may thus actually boost performance on simple learning 
tasks. Similarly, priming effects are usually said to rely on associations (see the chapter ―the 
associative machine‖ in Kahneman, 2011), which may suggest that priming associative 
reasoning could increase results obtained from priming tasks.  
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